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UNCOVERING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF THE EARLY MAIL
FRAUD STATUTES: THE ORIGIN OF FEDERAL AUXILIARY CRIMES
JURISDICTION
Norman Abrams*
Abstract
The federal crime of mail fraud is generally viewed as the original
federal auxiliary jurisdiction crime, that is, a crime that does not protect
direct federal interests against harm. Rather, it functions as an auxiliary
to state crime enforcement. In the almost 150 years since Congress
enacted the mail fraud statute, federal auxiliary crimes have proliferated
and have become the most important part of federal criminal
jurisdiction—so that, today, they largely duplicate state crimes. It is
important to know how this form of federal criminal jurisdiction
originated.
Mail fraud is a crime that scholars, judges, and lawyers have viewed
as having almost no legislative histories linked to its original enactment
in 1872 and its two revisions in 1889 and 1909. The details of its origins
have remained generally unknown.
This paper breaks new ground by uncovering a rich set of legislative
history details related to each of those three early statutes. Inter alia, these
legislative history materials reveal that the original mail fraud provision
might not have been drafted and enacted except for the fortuitous timing
of the addition of a criminal penalty to a closely related statute. It also
explains how mail fraud came to be the original federal auxiliary
jurisdiction crime; that was not the original intention.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1948, Professor Louis B. Schwartz published a landmark article on the
federal criminal system.1 His paper emphasized a category of federal crimes that he
termed “Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Auxiliary to State Enforcement”—that is,
crimes whose primary purpose was not federal self-defensive criminal jurisdiction
(i.e., protection of federal money, property, personnel, or other direct federal
interests). Rather, federal auxiliary crimes involved enlisting “federal power in the
battle against [conduct typically prosecuted under state law such as] obscenity,
*

© 2021 Norman Abrams. Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA Law
School. For research associated with this paper, I am indebted to my student research
assistants: Matheiu Cunha, Elise Jacobsen, and Theodore Mayer. I also want to express my
deep appreciation to my long-time colleagues Professors Herbert Morris and Stephen Yeazell
who read an earlier draft of the paper.
1
L. B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 13 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 64 (1948).

1079

1080

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

lotteries, theft, alcoholism, and prostitution . . . .”2 Today, the number and content
of such federal crimes have grown to the point that federal auxiliary crimes, to a
significant extent, overlap with traditional state criminal codes.3
Scholars who study federal criminal law and judges who decide federal
criminal cases have uniformly concluded that the original federal auxiliary crime
was mail fraud.4 Congress enacted the first statute criminalizing mail fraud in 1872.5
2
Id. The criminal categories are instructive. All of them are kinds of criminal activities
that the late 19th to early 20th century moral crusaders targeted. Later in this Article, we
shall see some evidence of the influence of a prominent moral crusader directly on the
legislative process in Congress relating to our subject matter. While determining the overall
influence of the Victorian Age moral crusaders on the development of early federal crimes
is not the subject matter of this paper, it is a topic worth pursuing. This Article calls attention
to signs of their influence where it seems appropriate to do so.
3
Another paper that provides important background for this study is an article on the
mail fraud statute and its early history written forty years ago, in 1980, by Jed S. Rakoff who
currently is a United States District Court Judge. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud
Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771 (1980). One is hard-pressed to improve upon the
excellence of Judge Rakoff’s basic analysis. With the assistance of executive and legislative
branch materials, however, many of which were not available at the time, important additions
can be made to this early legislative story that provide insights and increase our
understanding of this important piece of federal legal history.
4
See generally N. Abrams, Consultants Report on Jurisdiction: Chapter 2, in
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
VOLUME I 33, 34 (U.S. Government Printing Office ed., 1968) (providing the historical
development of federal auxiliary crime); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (citing the current version
of the mail fraud statute).
5
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 288, 323 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1341). See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:
Someone to Watch over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 158 n.12 (1994) (“[L]aw marked the
first use by Congress of its postal authority to criminalize conduct that posed no obvious
threat to a federal interest.”) (citing Symposium, Federalism and the Scope of the Federal
Criminal Law, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1737, 1738 (1989)).
It might be suggested that there are other candidates for the title of the original federal
auxiliary offenses—namely, the federal offenses of conspiring “either to commit any offence
against the laws of the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner whatever
. . . .” Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 471, at 484 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1341). These two offenses first became law in Section 30, five years before the 1872
enactment of the mail fraud provision. See id. But the question is whether they have the
character of federal auxiliary offenses or are better viewed as federal self-defensive crimes.
On several grounds, the latter characterization is more apt. Section 30 was a provision in an
act that was a set of revenue laws dealing with revenue matters in all its other provisions.
Section 30 described an offense consisting of a conspiracy to defraud the United States in
one of its clauses. Whether or not designed to protect the revenues of the U.S., by its terms,
this clause was intended to be protective of the federal government against fraud and thus
fairly described as a federal self-defensive offense. See id; U.S. v. Hirsch, 100 U.S. 33, 34
(1879) (noting that Section 30 was “intended solely for the protection of the revenue arising
from customs . . . .”). What about basing the earliest auxiliary offense argument on the
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Most scholars have also observed that, with the exception of one general statement
made during the relevant congressional debates,6 there is no legislative history
available that provides useful details about the origins of the 1872 mail fraud
statute,7 nor about the two revisions that occurred in 18898 and 1909.9
Contrary to these observations, this paper uncovers a rich legislative history
linked to the original mail fraud statute. That history makes clear a conclusion that
scholars and judges had not previously drawn10—that the mail fraud statute, as
originally drafted, was mainly intended to be a federal self-defensive statute.11
Legislators designed the statute primarily to protect against harms to a direct federal
interest: the postal system and the post office establishment. It was only in 1909,
almost forty years after its original enactment, that Congress stripped out the
language in the statute that incorporated its harms-to-the-mails features, and only
then did mail fraud truly become the first pure federal auxiliary crime.12
The statute underwent important amendments in its 1889 revision13 and was
pared down in the 1909 revision.14 This Article describes and closely examines the
conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States clause of Section 30? Whether a
crime charged under this clause could be described as auxiliary to state enforcement systems
or federal self-defensive would seem to depend on the nature of the offense against the
United States that was the object of the particular conspiracy. At the time this conspiracy
provision was enacted, however, there were no other federal auxiliary crimes on the statute
books.
6
See, e.g., Peter R. Ezersky, Intra-corporate Mail and Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability
for Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427, 1428 n.3 (1985) (“The bill’s sponsor stated that
the provision was necessary ‘to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large
cities . . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and
fleeing the innocent people in the country.’”) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35
(1870) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth)). A detailed treatment of this portion of the
congressional debates is presented below. See discussion infra Part II. See also Bettman v.
United States, 224 F. 819, 823 (6th Cir. 1915) (discussing the legislative history).
7
See Rakoff, supra note 3, at 779 (“In view of the novelty and breadth of this section,
it is surprising that it generated no congressional debate or other legislative history explaining
its origins and purpose.”). See also Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C.
L. REV. 223, 225 (1992) (“The crime of mail fraud emanates from an 1872 recodification of
the Postal Act. The initiation of this criminal offense generated no congressional debate and
therefore no legislative history.”).
8
See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The
Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 445 (1995) (“There is no
legislative history for the [1889] amendment . . . .”).
9
Regarding the 1909 amendment of the mail fraud statute, see Rakoff, supra note 3, at
816 n.205 (“[A]gain, there is virtually no direct legislative history that might otherwise serve
to manifest the legislative purpose.”).
10
See, e.g., id. at 779 (“[I]t is surprising that [the original Mail Fraud Statute] generated
no congressional debate or other legislative history explaining its origins and purpose.”).
11
See Henning, supra note 8, at 437. See also Section II.A.2.
12
See also Section IV.B.
13
See Henning, supra note 8, at 445.
14
Id. at 447–48; Rakoff, supra note 3, at 816–21.
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executive and legislative branch documents and actions that were behind the
complex story of the 1872 enactment.15 It then recounts the direct legislative history
relating to the two subsequent revisions of the statute, including the last one, which
stripped the federal self-defensive language from the statute.16
Converting the mail fraud statute, which was drafted primarily as a federal selfdefense offense, into an authentic federal auxiliary jurisdiction offense can be
viewed as a significant historic legislative change. Strikingly, there is no evidence
that Congress appreciated the importance of this transformation at the time it
occurred. This change, however, turned out to have major, long-term consequences.
It enabled the crime of mail fraud to be used to prosecute conduct far removed from
typical fraud and to become the wellspring of federal crimes that were purely
auxiliary to state criminal enforcement. Congress subsequently enacted many such
offenses in different forms.
The conclusion reached by many scholars and judges that there are no
significant legislative history materials that explain the origins of the early mail
fraud statutes is in part based on the paucity of substantive legislative history sources
directly related to the original mail fraud statute (i.e., legislative committee reports,
committee hearings, etc.). The fact is, however, that one can deduce a great deal
about how the original mail fraud offense came to be legislated by piecing together
and drawing inferences from a trove of closely related executive and legislative
source materials that came out of the period leading up to, and immediately before
and after, the introduction of the original mail fraud bill. There is also more to be
learned from the congressional debates alluded to above that prior treatments have
overlooked. Together, all these materials provide a rich and compelling explanation
framing the origins of Section 301—the mail fraud statute—as enacted by Congress
on June 8, 1872.17 This story, with the explanation presented here, has not previously
been told.
15

See Henning, supra note 8, at 442; Rakoff, supra note 3, at 779–86.
See Henning, supra note 8, at 447–48; see, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 3 (detailing the
revisions of the mail fraud statute in both 1889 and 1909).
17
Many of the documentary sources that bear on the original mail fraud bill have been
available for some years; they have not been hidden. Strangely, some of them have hardly
ever been taken note of in scholarly works or judicial opinions. While some have been
alluded to by scholars, they have not been addressed in detail. See, e.g., DOROTHY GANFIELD
FOWLER, UNMAILABLE: CONGRESS AND THE POST OFFICE 55–57 (1977); Gregory Howard
Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud,
32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137 (1990) (discussing the broad application of the mail fraud statute). An
example of such a document is: JOSEPH H. BLACKFAN, C. F. MACDONALD & JOSEPH A.
WARE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE POSTMASTER GENERAL TO EXAMINE
AND REVISE THE POSTAL CODE, CONG. COMM’N (1870) [hereinafter PMG COMMITTEE
REPORT] (cited in the Brief for the Petitioner at 19, Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 629
(1926) and referred to in Williams, supra, at 140 n.24). Another key document which has
been almost entirely overlooked by scholars is the 1866 letter from the Solicitor of the Post
Office Department, which was mentioned briefly in an article dealing with gambling, not
16
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The paper is divided into Parts. Part II begins with a detailed analysis of Section
301 and then reviews a series of documents, statutory materials, and congressional
debates that tell the story of the original version of the mail fraud statute. It also
includes a brief treatment of relevant case law between 1872 and 1889. Part III
initially analyzes the language of the 1889 revision of the mail fraud statute and then
focuses on the immediate legislative history leading up to the enactment of that
revision. Part IV reviews the language of the 1909 revision of the statute and details
the legislative history related to that revision.
II. SECTION 301 AND RELATED EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS
AND ENACTMENTS
A. Introduction
This Part examines the original text of Section 301 and then presents a series
of interrelated documents and legislative materials that explain how the mail fraud
provision came to be drafted. These documents and materials include: (1) a Post
Office Department letter written in 1866 by the Solicitor of the Post Office
Department (with accompanying documents);18 (2) a statutory provision enacted in
1868—likely to have been in response to the 1866 Post Office Department letter;19
(3) an excerpt from a March 30, 1870 Report of a committee appointed by the
Postmaster General commenting on draft Post Office legislation prepared by a
statutorily authorized Congressional Commission;20 (4) a postal code legislative
package that was introduced into Congress in June 187021 shortly after the March
Report of the Postmaster General’s Committee; (5) Congressional debates from
December 1870 regarding certain provisions of the H.R. 2295 postal code package;22
and (6) a couple of provisions23 from the postal code legislative package, in addition
to the mail fraud provision finally enacted in June 1872.24

mail fraud. JOSEPH A. WARE, LETTER OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
S. MISC. DOC. NO. 39-57, at 1–3 (1st Sess. 1866); see G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland,
The Development of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 931 at n.25
(1978). Some scholars have made general observations about the history of the mail fraud
statute, but they have not examined or analyzed these key documents. See, e.g., Ezersky,
supra note 6, at 1427 (“Mail/wire fraud law has evolved from its origins as an antidote to
‘lottery swindles.’”).
18
WARE, supra note 17. This document includes two accompanying items. See infra
note 39 and accompanying text.
19
Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194.
20
PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17.
21
H.R. 2295, 41st Cong. (June 24, 1870).
22
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 30–37 (1870).
23
H.R. 2295, 41st Cong. §§ 149 & 300 (June 24, 1870).
24
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 288, 323 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§1341).
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The tale reflected in the foregoing documents is complex, reads almost like a
detective story, and is worth telling.
1. Section 301 Enacted on June 8, 1872: The Original Mail Fraud Provision
We begin with an analysis of the language and elements of the mail fraud
statute, as enacted in June 1872.25
A close examination of the language of the provision helps provide a better
understanding of its structural features and purposes and how it compares with
traditional criminal statutes. An examination of its language—when viewed together
with executive and legislative documents discussed below—also sheds light on the
origins of this provision.
The mail fraud provision, as originally enacted by Congress, reads as follows:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or26 be effected by either opening or intending to open
correspondence or communication with any other person (whether
resident within or outside of the United States), by means of the post-office
establishment of the United States, or by inciting such other person to open
communication with the person so devising or intending, shall, in and for
executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting so to do), place any letter
or packet in any post-office of the United States, or take or receive any
therefrom, such person, so misusing the post-office establishment, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of not more
than five hundred dollars, with or without such imprisonment, as the court
shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar months. The indictment,
information, or complaint may severally charge offences to the number of
three, when committed within the same six calendar months, but the court
thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion the punishment
especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office establishment
enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and device.27
The extended verbiage of Section 301 in its original form appears to describe a
crime consisting of three essential elements. First, the mens rea language in Section
301 is framed as: “having devised . . . any scheme . . . to defraud . . . [to] be effected

25

Id.
The original statute contained a typographical error—the word “or” should have been
“to,” and the typo was subsequently corrected. Other minor, non-substantive changes were
made, particularly to the penalty language at the end of the section, when Section 301 was
incorporated into the Revised Statutes as Section 5480.
27
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 288, 323.
26
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by . . . opening28 . . . or intending to open correspondence . . . with any other person
. . . by means of the post office establishment . . . .”29
The mens rea of the offense is thus complex. It translates into planning to
defraud someone, and part of the plan is to open correspondence with another
person. Several things are noteworthy in describing this element of the offense. First,
this portion of the mens rea element is cast not in terms of the usual limited mental
state terminology such as knowing, intending, etc. Rather, it is described as devising
a scheme to defraud, i.e., developing a plan to defraud someone. Planning implies a
more complex and extended mental state than simply intending a simple act, and
certain aspects of the requisite plan are spelled out in the statute. Thus, the planned
fraud must contemplate the use of the mails, but that aspect is framed in terms of
opening correspondence with someone by means of the post office establishment.
While it is not expressly stated, in most, if not all, contexts, this correspondence
would be likely to be between the perpetrator and their victim(s), and thus, the
correspondence to be opened would likely be a significant and central part of the
scheme.30
Interestingly, the mens rea language does not require that the correspondence
actually be opened; rather, it states that it need only “to be effected by either opening
or intending to open correspondence . . . .”31 Up to this point, the statute deals with
mental activity that need not have been realized through any conduct or actus reus
component of the offense—that is, inchoate conduct.
28

Insofar as the scheme devised was to be affected by opening correspondence, it
contemplated planning to do something in the future, which only required something
planned, not something accomplished. Adding “or intending to open correspondence”
highlights the inchoate nature of the scheme; it is not necessary that the opening of
correspondence be accomplished for criminal liability to attach. Id.
29
Id.
30
The significance of this statutory language as bearing on the necessary relationship
of the use of mails to the fraudulent scheme was taken note of by some courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mitchell, 36 Fed. 492, 493 (W.D. Pa.1888) (“A careful study of the language
employed has convinced me that it was not intended that this section should embrace every
case where a letter promotive of, or connected with, a fraudulent design, may be sent through
the post-office by the person engaged in or contemplating the fraud. As was said in Brand v.
U.S., 4 Fed.Rep. 395, the scheme to defraud within the meaning of said section is one which
is to be effected by the deviser of it opening a correspondence by mail, or by inciting some
one else to open such correspondence with him. To constitute the statutory offense, then,
something more is necessary than the mere sending through the mail of a letter forming part,
or designed to aid in the perpetration, of a fraud. The scope of the section was considered in
U.S. v. Owens, 17 Fed. Rep. 72, 74, by Judge Treat, who said: ‘It appears to the court that
the act was designed to strike at common schemes of fraud, whereby, through the post-office,
circulars, etc., are distributed, generally to entrap and defraud the unwary; and not the
supervision of commercial correspondence solely between a debtor and creditor.’”). Note
that in Owens, the court highlights frauds that involve sending circulars through the mails,
that is, large-scale mailings seeking victims from among the public at large. United States v.
Owens, 17 Fed. Rep. 72, 74 (E.D. Mo.1883).
31
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 288, 323.
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The actus reus component is fulfilled by the requirement in the statute that the
person to be charged have “for executing the scheme . . . placed a letter or packet in
any post office.”32 Despite having set up a complex mental state requirement—the
devising of a scheme—the statute here requires a more traditional specific mens rea
and actus reus, that is, for purposes of executing the scheme, the accused deposits a
letter in the post office. In other words, the accused must have the purpose of
furthering the scheme when they deposit a letter in the mails.
Up to this point, the statute has described a mens rea and an actus reus. Most
criminal statutes stop there. What makes this statute especially unusual is what
comes next in its provisions. There is a clause that indicates that by engaging in the
aforesaid conduct with the aforesaid mens rea, the perpetrator would be “so misusing
the post-office establishment.”33 The notion that the previously described elements
of the offense involve a misuse of—that is, cause harm to—the post office
establishment is initially introduced into the offense through this clause. This notion
that the offense is aimed at addressing real harms to the post office establishment is
further reinforced by the final sentence in Section 301, which instructs the judge in
sentencing a person convicted of this offense to “proportion the punishment,
especially to the degree to which the abuse of the post-office establishment enters as
an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and device.”34
Including the opening of correspondence as an element of the planned scheme
seems intended to ensure that the use of the mails is a central element in the scheme.
Combining that with language that speaks of misuse of the post office establishment
and adding to it the final provision relating to the proportioning of punishment35
seems to strongly indicate that the drafters conceived of this offense as one aimed at
protecting the post office against the harms caused to it by fraud schemes (rather
than thinking of it only as fraud that happened to be perpetrated through the mails).
Further confirmation of this view can be found in the facts noted above: the
fraud feature of the offense is only found in the mens rea element, and the statute
does not require a completed fraud to impose criminal liability (only the devising of
a scheme to defraud). With respect to the fraud element, the crime is only required
32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.
35
It is worth noting that this is a very early version of a sentencing guideline. The
seeming indeterminate nature of the inquiry by the judge under the proportionate punishment
provision led Rakoff to conclude as follows:
33

The only plausible reason for including such an ambiguous, abstract and amoral
provision, which would appear to be wholly unamenable to principled application
and unlikely ever to be given effect, was to demonstrate a concern with “abuse”
of the mail, and thus to make it less likely that the statute would be struck down
as an unconstitutional extension of federal jurisdiction over ordinary fraud.
Rakoff, supra note 3, at 785.
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to be the rough equivalent of an attempt, inchoate with respect to the harm involved
in the fraud.
Drafting a statute in this form and making the criminality of the offense so
heavily dependent on the mental state of the actor (i.e., their subjective state of mind
at the time the crime was allegedly committed) was unusual in this relatively early
period of the development of the criminal law in the United States. If the main goal
were to create a crime that protected the mails against the harms that could be caused
by frauds involving the use of the mails, the actual perpetration of the fraud would
be less significant than the acts that would cause harm to the mails. In this context,
it should not be a surprise that the perpetration of the fraud need not have occurred
for the crime to be committed.
Finally, if there were still any doubt about the conclusion that the drafters
intended Section 301 to be primarily a federal self-defensive offense aimed at
protecting an important federal institution, confirmation can be found in the
descriptive note in the margin of the original enactment of Section 301 which
provided: “Penalty for misusing the post-office establishment, by opening, &c.,
correspondence with intent to defraud, and placing, &c., letter in post-office.”36
Based on the last sentence in Section 301, it would seem that the drafters
assumed that different schemes to defraud might have a differentially harmful
impact on the post office and the operation of the mails: the judge was supposed to
take those differences in harm into account when determining the punishment within
the statutory maximum. The different types of harms that the judge might weigh in
sentencing are discussed, infra in Section II.A.2.d.
A lurking concern remains, however. The typical federal self-defensive offense
establishes its character by including in the actus reus of the offense aspects of the
harms to the specific federal interest. But here, the direct protection against harms
to the Post Office Department is introduced indirectly—in the process of sentencing
by the judge. This approach does not ensure that before this offense can be
committed actual harms must have been caused to the post office establishment.
2. The 1866 Post Office Department Letter
(a) Introduction
We turn now to consider a series of different sources that, together, help explain
the drafting of the original mail fraud provision. A letter dealing with lottery fraud
dated February 16, 1866,37 not previously considered by anyone concerned with the
history of Section 301, was written in support of a proposed bill, S. 14838 by the
Solicitor of the Post Office Department, Joseph A. Ware—an important character in
this tale. Mr. Ware sent the letter in question to the Postmaster General who endorsed

36

Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 288, 323.
See WARE, supra note 17.
38
S. 148, 39th Cong. (1866). See infra note 45 for a description of this bill.
37
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it. It was then sent to the Senate for printing and referral to the Committee on the
Post Office and Post Roads.39
In 1868, a provision was enacted, Section 13, as part of a postal laws revision
that dealt with lotteries (but not expressly dealing with lottery fraud, which is the
subject of the 1866 letter).40 Given its subject matter and timing, however, it would
appear to have been in at least partial response to the 1866 letter. It also constitutes
an important transitional provision that, as we shall see, ultimately played a key role
in the development of Section 301. This 1868 statutory provision is discussed in the
next section.
The 1866 letter is an especially important document in the history of Section
301. Together with some additional documents discussed below, we learn several
different things: e.g., the likely originally perceived need for the federal crime of
mail fraud and an explanation for the harms-to-the-post-office-establishment
language contained in the original mail fraud provision.
Importantly, this letter, plus other documents to be discussed below, support
the notion that the federal mail fraud crime likely had its origin in concerns about
mass-mailings-to-the-public-lottery-frauds and other similar mass-mailing
swindles. Also, as we shall see below, the kind of harms to the post office
establishment caused through the perpetration of lottery frauds that are described in
detail in the 1866 letter help explain the original purpose of, and language in, the
mail fraud provision that refers to the misuse of the post office and proportioning
the punishment. One cannot read this letter without realizing that the primary
motivation for writing the letter and the drafting of implementing legislation41 was
to protect the mails and the post office establishment from the type of harms that are
described in the letter.

39
See WARE, supra note 17. The letter was accompanied by a legal opinion that had
been written immediately prior to the onset of the Civil War by the then-Attorney General
and concerned a different but related issue. See Fraudulent Lottery and Gift Enterprises, Op.
Att’y Gen. (July 24, 1860) (containing an opinion from Attorney General Black explaining
the circumstances when the Post Office Department can order the non-delivery of letters due
to fraud). Because of the war, this opinion probably languished in a drawer for a half dozen
years, only to be retrieved and used in connection with the 1866 letter. The opinion addressed
a question posed by an actual instance, whether the Postmaster General could authorize nondelivery and sending letters addressed to fictitious persons to the dead letter office. The
Attorney General opined that the Postmaster General had such inherent authority if the letter
was sent with an intent to defraud. The first section of S. 148, 39th Cong. (1866), the bill that
accompanied the Solicitor’s 1866 letter, would have expressly incorporated into statutory
law the Postmaster General’s authority to do so.
40
See WARE, supra note 17; Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194. Insofar
as this statute made unlawful the mailing of lottery materials, it would also cover lottery
fraud materials.
41
In this instance, the proposed implementing legislation was not the familiar mail
fraud statute. Instead, the legislation was S. 148, which was aimed at lottery fraud-type
crimes through narrowly crafted statutory language. See infra note 45 and accompanying
text.
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(b) Contents of the 1866 Letter
The following excerpts from the 1866 letter provide its general tenor and
substance:
Sir: I desire to call your attention to the necessity of further legislation in
regard to fraudulent “lottery” and “gift enterprises”42 schemes which are
carried on, advertised, and made successful by using the mails of the
United States.43
It is not the business of the Post Office Department to detect and pursue
all dishonest transactions of this character, but many cases have been
brought to my notice where persons have prostituted the mail service to
purposes of fraud and have so ingeniously arranged their schemes that the
victims cast the entire odium of their losses on the Post Office Department
....
. . . [B]y appropriate legislation by Congress giving certain powers to the
Postmaster General . . . the officers of the government will be relieved
from the accusations of defalcation and theft which are now daily brought
against them.
I wish now to call your attention to a few cases . . . which will explain my
ideas more fully.
A certain firm in New York obtains names of persons living in the rural
districts . . . and sends through the mail circulars of a “gift enterprise”
scheme which is notoriously fraudulent. They receive, in answer to these
circulars, a large amount of money every day. Whenever complaint is
made of the loss of money, they say either that they have never received
the money or they have mailed the promised package. Thus, they place the
whole blame on the Post Office Department . . . .
. . . [T]he persons who are swindled in this manner believe that their losses
are due to the defective organization of the Post Office Department . . . .
Complaints are received by the postmaster at Brooklyn by hundreds, and
everyday complaints are received in New York.

42
See Gift Enterprise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A scheme for the
distribution of items by chance among those who have purchased shares in the scheme.”). In
other words, a gift enterprise scheme is a type of lottery.
43
This last clause is similar to language in the Postmaster General Committee Report,
see infra text at note 59.
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In nearly all of these complaints it is assumed that the fault of the nondelivery of the goods or the non-reception of the money lies at the door of
the Post Office Department . . . . By the representations of the authors of
the fraud, the blame is thrown on the Post Office Department . . . .
[W]hat makes it more difficult to break up these fraudulent practices is the
fact that in scarcely any of the States are there any laws which cover these
offenses. Under the various State laws for the obtaining of money under
false pretences, no conviction can be had for obtaining money by means
of a promise which has not been fulfilled . . . .That . . . [the frauds] are
carried on so cheaply and successfully as they are is due solely to facilities
afforded by the mail[], for if these men were compelled to advertise in the
newspapers44 instead of sending circulars through the mails, they would
be compelled to undergo considerable expense, and might in some States
be subject to the operation of State laws.
Unless some power is vested in the Postmaster General, and some statute
passed by Congress declaring these offenses to be criminal, the persons
who are now making fortunes in this fraudulent business will go on in the
future as in the past without punishment.
Complaints are received . . . by hundreds, which show that this fraudulent
business is carried on very extensively. The labor of answering complaints
is a great tax on the clerical force of the department, and it is impossible,
in many cases, to give any satisfaction to the persons defrauded. The whole
blame of their loss is laid upon the Post Office Department.
I enclose a draught of a statute, which I respectfully recommend to your
consideration. The first section gives the power to detain letters addressed
to a fictitious address, adopted for fraudulent purposes . . . . in most of the
cases for which legislation is needed, the addresses are fictitious.
Under the second section, persons committing these frauds are subject to
criminal prosecution . . . .
I think that provisions contained in the first two sections are indispensable
for protection of the people against fraudulent schemes and for the relief

44

The reference to the use of newspapers as a way to initiate contact with potential
victims is a foreshadowing of a technique used in such frauds that came to be used more
frequently later and had a role in the 1909 revision of the mail fraud statute. See infra note
149 and accompanying text.
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of the Post Office Department from the constant and often-recurring
imputation of dishonesty, carelessness, and incompetency.45
(c) Lottery Frauds as a Primary Target
The main purpose of the Postal Department in writing the aforementioned letter
was (1) to address the impact that fraudulent lotteries and gift enterprises schemes
were having on the mails and the postal establishment, and (2) to provide support
for a proposed legislative bill on that subject.
Inter alia, this attack on fraudulent lotteries may also have been an advance
indication of a shift in the public’s and federal government’s attitude toward lotteries
themselves, which, in the early days of the nation, had become widespread
throughout the country and an important source of revenue for state and local
governments.46 The lottery had crossed over from Europe and “rooted itself in the
everyday life of the colonies.”47 Historian John Samuel Ezell explained, “The lottery
was believed to be necessary during this period of transition in which the states
moved from a condition of decentralization toward the unity provided by the
Constitution. In the new and economically embarrassed country, these schemes
flourished and grew with the nation. To discard them as a financial crutch would not
be easy.”48
But after the Civil War, arguably, the wheel had begun to turn; moral crusaders
who spoke out against gambling and other vices were beginning to gain traction, and
changes in public attitudes led to increased opposition to the institution of the lottery
itself. By virtue of the 1866 letter and, arguably, its subsequent implementation in
1868, 1872, and later legislation, the federal government came to join the fray on
the side of the opposition.

45

See WARE, supra note 17 (the Solicitor of the Post Office Department’s views
explaining Senate Bill No. 148 of the 39th Congress, a bill to prevent the perversion of the
mails to fraudulent and illegal purposes). The accompanying legislative bill, S. 148,
contained three sections: the first would have authorized the Postmaster General to send to
the dead letter office letters mailed to fictitious addresses with intent to defraud; the second
would attach a criminal penalty to inducing individuals through circulars or handbills sent
through the mail to invest money in a lottery, gift enterprise, or other game of chance which
is carried on with intent to deceive and defraud; the third section of the bill would criminalize
falsely asserting with intent to deceive and defraud non-receipt of money or valuable articles
or the deposit of money or valuable articles for transmission through the mail. S. 148, 39th
Cong. (1866).
46
See, e.g., JOHN SAMUEL EZELL, FORTUNE’S MERRY WHEEL: THE LOTTERY IN
AMERICA 12 (1960).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 78.
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The 1866 letter49 can thus be seen as both an attack on a type of widespread
mass-mailing fraudulent behavior (lotteries and gift enterprises in which prizes or
gifts were promised but not sent)—schemes that were causing harms to the post
office itself as well as to its many victims—and as an initial step by the federal
executive branch against the institution of the lottery in its role in the economy of
the nation. One should keep in mind that, at the time, the post office and the delivery
of the mail were already a key instrument of the central government, perhaps the
only federal operation that was encountered on a daily basis by the general populace.
(d) Harms to the Mails and the Post Office Establishment
Fraudulent lottery or gift enterprise schemes were typically initiated by sending
hundreds, even thousands, of “circulars” through the mails to a great many potential
victims who were enticed into purchasing one or more lottery tickets with the false
promise that they would receive a prize or gift. What made the schemes extremely
profitable for the perpetrators was the fact that so many circulars were sent out by
mail that the accumulation of a great many small sums from the gullible victims
added up to large criminal profits. The scheme was dependent on mass mailings and
enticing a great number of recipients into becoming victims. That kind of scheme
caused a variety of harms to the operation of the mail service, the post office
establishment, and the lives of a great many people.
To return, for a moment, to the description in the Solicitor’s 1866 letter of
harms to the post office establishment, perhaps the most serious type of harm, when
it is present in the commission of the crime, is that which flows from the defrauders
falsely placing the blame on the Post Office Department for the alleged failure to
deliver prizes through the mail, or making similar false claims that they never
received the victim’s application and money that were sent through the mails. The
post office is thereby made the scapegoat of the crime. Its reputation is harmed, even
destroyed, and, as a result, the general populace is given reason to lose faith in the
reliability and trustworthiness of the post office delivery system.
A second type of harm is caused by using fictitious names to hide the scheme
and perpetrators from the authorities. The use of false names initially put a special
burden on postal workers and mail carriers trying to deliver the letters to the
addressees. Typically, the return letters replying to the circulars were forwarded
from fictitious addressees at one or two post offices to a fictitious name addressed
to a bar or other public establishment (where the letter could be picked up by an
agent of the fraudsters). This was all done in aid of the scheme to conceal the true
identity and location of the perpetrators, thereby putting a special burden on postal
inspectors trying to track down the culprits.

49

See WARE, supra note 17. As far as can be determined, this document has not
previously been identified as being related to the origins of the mail fraud statute. In a way,
this is not surprising since the document was written six years before the mail fraud statute
became law and dealt with a specific type of conduct—lottery fraud.
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A third type of harm flowing from such schemes, especially where the scheme
is widespread and there are many victims, is that the post office receives a
multiplicity of complaints from the victims. The 1866 letter highlighted this fact.
These complaints needed to be processed and investigated, thus engaging many post
office personnel and committing substantial resources to the pursuit of the
perpetrators. The larger the scheme, the greater the number of letters and circulars
sent to the intended victims, the greater the number of complaints by victims, and
the greater the harm caused to the Post Office Department.
A fourth type of harm is that the hundreds, even thousands, of letters containing
circulars overburdened the post office and mail carriers with all the actions that are
involved in their delivery. It is true that it is the responsibility of the post office to
deliver the mail, but when doing so involves massive numbers of circulars sent with
the purpose of perpetrating crimes, it is arguably an unjustified burden and can be
viewed as a real harm not warranted by the notion of fulfilling the responsibilities
of the post office. It should be emphasized that these harms to the mails and the post
office described in the letter are not figurative or a legal fiction.50 These are specific,
concrete harms.
Finally, it is important to note that the nature of the harms caused by fraudulent
conduct involving the use of the mails would vary depending on the nature and
details of the fraudulent scheme. Mass mailing frauds like the lottery swindles
probably present the greatest potential for causing actual harms to the post office
establishment. Even among mass mailing schemes, however, there can be different
kinds of schemes which, depending on their elements, may present a different
potential for causing harms to the post office establishment.51
On the face of it, it seems likely that it was harms such as those listed above
that were intended to be taken into account under the sentencing provision contained
in the original mail fraud provision. Thus, it can be argued that in assessing the
degree of harm to (i.e., abuse of) the Post Office Department under the language of
Section 301, the sentencing judge was expected to take into account the particular
methods used (e.g., blaming the post office for asserted non-delivery or non-receipt,
the number of mailings, the number of potential victims, etc.). At the same time, it
must be conceded that the statutory means chosen to effect the goal of having the
judge in sentencing determine the proportionate harm to the mails was not hardedged and left room for many cases where prosecutions under the statute could be
undertaken, despite the absence of indications of concrete harms to the post office.52
50

Much later in the history of the mail fraud statute, the courts also speak of schemes
to defraud using the mails as causing harm to the mails. However, in those allusions, it is
clear that the courts are speaking metaphorically and that the harms in question are fictional.
51
See, e.g., the discussion of the sawdust swindle mass mailing schemes, infra notes
98 & 123 and accompanying text; Hanley v. United States, 127 F. 929, 931 (2d Cir. 1904)
(discussing the fact that 14,000 “first letters” were mailed, followed by a second wave of
letters).
52
Recognition of the reality of the possible harms to the mails makes it harder to argue
that the “harms” language was inserted into the statute simply to bolster its constitutional
justification.
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It seems likely that the type of frauds described in the 1866 Post Office
Department letter would have been perceived as the archetypal most serious
offenses. Other actual harms to the post office establishment, albeit lesser harms,
might be present even in schemes to defraud where false blaming and scapegoating
were not present, or where the scheme had fewer victims. Where the use of the mails
is a central feature in the scheme—where the scheme takes place through the
opening and pursuing of correspondence through the mails with the victims—the
persons deceived as well as others, may also be inclined to attach blame to the mode
of communication and the deceptive materials themselves, especially in an era where
a nationwide postal system was seen as a relatively new form of supposedly reliable
communication.53
3. A Puzzle: If Section 301 Was Intended to Be a Self-Defensive Federal Crime,
Why Was Harm to the Post Office Establishment Not Made an Element of the
Crime, i.e., Not Included in the Actus Reus of the Offense?
Having concluded that, given the language of Section 301, the mail fraud statute
in its original form was intended primarily to protect a direct federal interest, it is
fair to ask: if the statute was aimed at punishing those who cause harm to the mails
or the post office establishment, why was it not drafted in a more traditional way by
making the causing of harm to the mails or the post office establishment part of the
actus reus of the offense?
To formulate such a provision is to immediately see the problems with it. The
notion of harm to the mail or the Post Office Department, as discussed above, can
take many forms and, even more important, can be a matter of degree. Ultimately, it
can consist of one or more different actions that may cause either minor or major
harm to the post office. The extent to which harms have been caused to the post
office by the accused’s conduct would inevitably be a matter that needs to be
assessed in the particular circumstances of the case—a kind of assessment that is
best considered by the judge as a factor in sentencing, rather than as an actus reus
element on which the guilt of the accused is to be predicated. Those who drafted the
original mail fraud statute would have understood this; hence, this helps to explain
the drafting approach that they chose. 54
53

Overall, the reputation and general perception of the mails as a source of good in the
society could be affected. Witness how today there have been demands for companies like
Facebook and Twitter to censor or prevent “bad” communications on their platforms. The
medium gets blamed for the “bad” message. See, e.g., Lily A. Coad, Compelling Code, A
First Amendment Argument Against Requiring Political Neutrality in Online Content
Moderation, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 487 (2021) (“Mark Zuckerberg explained, ‘We have
a different policy than, I think, Twitter on this . . . . I just believe strongly that Facebook
shouldn’t be the arbiter of truth of everything that people say online.’”).
54
The drafting approach used in Section 301 amounted to a non-traditional way to
create a self-defensive federal crime, and it suffered from some flaws. It left the
determination of harm essentially hidden from public view, determined by the essentially
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4. The 1868 Legislation Which Makes Unlawful the Mailing of Lottery Materials
Two years after the date of the 1866 letter and its accompanying documents,
Congress enacted post office legislation addressing a number of different postoffice-related topics. One section of this legislation, Section 13, is relevant to our
inquiry. It provided:
Section 13. And be it further enacted, That it shall not be lawful to deposit
in a post-office, to be sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning
lotteries, so-called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes
of any kind on any pretext whatever.55
While this provision makes the indicated conduct “not . . . lawful,” it is not a
criminal provision. It did not authorize criminal prosecution or the imposition of
criminal penalties. As explained later, Section 13 originally contained a criminal
penalty that was stricken during the legislative process. It seems likely that the
deletion of the criminal sanction was accomplished by legislators who supported the
institution of the lottery. Thus, by deleting the criminal sanction, they effectively
neutered the prohibition.
Section 13 may be seen as an initial effort to take away the mails as an
instrument of distributing lottery materials. If the effort had been successful, it would
have dealt a devastating blow to the lottery business. But for a few more years, at
least, lotteries remained protected. On this occasion, the anti-lottery forces had
effectively failed,56 but they had planted a flag, signaling their intentions.
Additionally, given its subject matter and enactment close in time to the 1866
letter, it is not unreasonable to view Section 13 as a legislative response to the
proposals made in the 1866 letter,57 even though it appears to have been applicable
unreviewable discretion of the judge. More important, cases could be successfully prosecuted
that did not involve the causing of concrete harms to the postal establishment. That may have
turned out to be a fatal weakness for a crime that was intended to be a federal self-defensive
offense.
55
Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, 15 Stat. 194.
56
What may be present here in enacting this legislation while deleting its criminal
penalty was a political move representing a microcosm of the then-ongoing debate regarding
lotteries during this post-civil war period.
57
Section 13 of the 1868 legislation was quite different from the specifically focused
nature of S. 148, 39th Cong. (1866)—the draft bill accompanying the 1866 letter—but it
could nevertheless have been seen as a satisfactory response to the proposals contained in
the letter, had its criminal penalties not been stricken before enactment. It would have
avoided requiring postal officials to make difficult determinations of intent in dealing with
the problem of fraudulent lotteries. Even without a criminal penalty, Section 13 can be
viewed as providing authority to the Postmaster General to issue regulations relating to
lottery circulars to deal with them administratively by seizing them or sending them to the
dead letter office. In this feature, Section 13 may be viewed as also responding to the 1860
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to all lottery materials and was not specially aimed at lottery fraud.58 Indeed, in the
next section, additional evidence is presented to support the view that there was a
direct line from the 1866 letter through the 1868 provision and then to the 1872 mail
fraud statute.
5. The Postmaster General Committee Report, March 30, 1870
A Report issued two years after the enactment of the lottery prohibition
provision (and four years after the 1866 Post Office Department letter) is a key
document for understanding the origins of the mail fraud statute. Dated March 30,
1870, it was prepared by a committee appointed by the Postmaster General59 to
comment on provisions of a draft postal code written by a congressionally authorized
commission. Of special interest are the comments in this Report on a particular
provision of this draft legislation: Section 152. This section in its unamended form
is substantially similar to Section 13—the 1868 statutory provision discussed in the
previous section. The relevant paragraph in this Report (hereinafter “Report” or
“PMG Report” or “PMG Committee Report”) reads as follows:
GIFT ENTERPRISES AND LOTTERIES. In section 152, the
amendments we propose are obviously such as are necessary to the
efficiency of the law. It contains no penalty. It is a naked declaration. We
are of opinion that Congress ought to go to the extreme limit of its power
to prevent the frauds which are perpetrated by lottery swindlers through
the mails, and which they could not successfully carry on except by using
mail facilities. An effort was made some time since to secure the passage
of an act “to prevent the perversion of the mails to improper purposes.” It
was but partially successful. The act proposed was so drawn as to affix
moderate penalties to the commission of the offenses therein described,
for without such penalties, the law would be a dead letter. The penalties
were stricken out, leaving the act practically inoperative. The report and
Opinion of the Attorney General that accompanied the 1866 letter. Act of July 27, 1868, ch.
246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196; S. 148, 39th Cong. (1866); WARE, supra note 17.
58
It could be argued that the inclusion of the phrase, “on any pretext whatever,” added
to this provision a limiting element of fraud or trickery, but this language is at best
ambiguous. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196.
59
PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, note 17, at 3 (this Committee, composed of post
office-related individuals was appointed by the Postmaster General on October 29, 1869);
see CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 957 (1871) (explaining that when introducing the
postal code legislative bill, Senator Ramsey described it, inter alia, as having been thoroughly
scrutinized by “a number of experts from the Post Office Department”); See PMG
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, note 17, at 32 (showing that, as indicated in the text, Joseph A.
Ware was a member of this Committee); Id. at 3 (describing in the introductory paragraph
of the PMG Committee’s Report, the Committee’s role, “to carefully examine the ‘statutes
relating to the postal service, as revised, simplified, arranged, and consolidated by the
commission appointed for that purpose’”).
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draught of an act on this subject were forwarded to Congress by one of
your predecessors. We strongly recommend the passage of an act similar
to the one proposed, but if that is deemed inexpedient, we then suggest
that some discretionary power be given to the officers of the department
to prevent the nefarious operations of lottery gamblers through the postal
service. For want of a more satisfactory statute, we suggest that section
152 be amended so as to read as follows:
‘SEC. 152. It shall not be lawful to convey by mail nor to deposit in a post
office, to be sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, socalled gift concerts, or concerning schemes devised and intended to
deceive and defraud the public for the purpose of obtaining money under
false pretenses;[60] and any such letters or circulars shall be detained by
the postmaster at the office of mailing or delivery and disposed of under
the instructions of the Postmaster General.61
Some of the sentences in the paragraph of text preceding the statutory draft
describe two documents that are not expressly identified. We believe we can identify
each of these documents with a reasonable degree of accuracy from the descriptions
contained therein.
The sentence that contains the statement that the “effort . . . made some time
since to secure the passage of an act . . . .” refers to the “partially successful” effort
involved in the passage of Section 13 enacted in 1868, as described in the previous
section of this paper.62 The two sentences following the “effort” sentence tell us that
Section 13, which, as enacted, had no criminal sanction, in fact as originally drawn
included a penalty, but “[t]he penalties were stricken out.”63
The sentence in the PMG Report that begins with, “The report and draught of
an act on this subject were forwarded to Congress . . . .”64 refers to the 1866 letter
from the Solicitor of the Post Office and the accompanying proposed S.148, both of
which would certainly have been familiar to the Committee since the author of the
1866 letter, Joseph A. Ware, then Solicitor of the Post Office Department, was now
a member of the PMG Committee making the instant Report, and probably was
responsible for the sentences we have just reviewed. That he was a member of this
Committee serves to provide a human link from the 1866 letter, through the 1868
Section 13 statute, to the 1870 PMG Committee Report, which recommends the
enactment of Section 152 (viz. essentially the 1868 statute’s Section 13 but with the
italicized language added by the PMG Committee).

60

The text in italics represents the amended language recommended in the PMG
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at 20.
61
Id.
62
See supra Section II.A.5.
63
PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at 19–20.
64
Id. at 20.
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The PMG Committee Report in the final three sentences of the excerpt supports
enactment of lottery fraud legislation similar to S. 148, as had been proposed in the
Solicitor’s 1866 letter, and, if not, the granting of broad discretion with respect to
lottery gambling generally and the enactment of an amended Section 152.
The PMG Committee Report also proposed adding the italicized language
above to Section 152, to broaden the scope of the section—making unlawful not
only the mailing of letters and circulars containing lottery or gift concert materials
but also letters and circulars concerning any fraudulent schemes. This addition can
be seen as reflecting Joseph Ware’s continuing concern65 to prevent lottery fraud.66
Notably, however, the PMG committee did not include or recommend the addition
of a criminal penalty to Section 152.
Given the PMG Committee’s obvious desire to strengthen the anti-fraud
capability of Section 152, the failure to recommend the addition of a criminal penalty
to this section initially seems surprising. A plausible explanation is that the PMG
Committee, as indicated in the Report, was aware that a criminal penalty originally
had been part of the bill enacted as Section 13 in the 1868 legislation, but the penalty
language in that section had been stricken before the bill was passed. Accordingly,
it would not have been unreasonable for the Committee to have anticipated a similar
fate for any language attempting to add a criminal penalty to the lottery materials
prohibition language of Section 152.67
6. HR 2295 and the Original Version of the Mail Fraud Statute
Less than three months after the March 30, 1870 issuance of the PMG
Committee Report, on June 24, 1870, Representative Farnsworth, Chair of the
House Committee on the Post Offices and Post Roads, on behalf of the Committee,
introduced HR 2295, a comprehensive package of post-office-related legislation that
generally tracked the draft prepared by the Congressional Commission, with such
tweaks as were recommended by the PMG Committee Report.68 Thus, HR 2295 also
65

It is appreciated that we are interpreting Committee’s recommendation as that of
Ware. This interpretation assumes that Ware was likely to have been a highly influential
voice on the Committee with respect to these issues, a not-unreasonable inference to draw.
66
It is possible, of course, that the 1866 letter that focused on lottery frauds had, in fact,
been using that approach as a subterfuge and that its real target was lotteries as such. Indeed,
the fact that the 1868 statute targeted lotteries, not lottery fraud, might be offered in support
of that hypothesis. While we cannot know for certain what was in Joseph Ware’s mind, he
seems to have consistently been focused on lotteries and similar games used as part of
fraudulent schemes.
67
The irony, of course, is that a criminal penalty was later added to that section during
the subsequent legislative process. See infra note 101; CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess.
35 (1870).
68
The Commission’s draft, as reviewed by the PMG committee, ended at Section 295.
Hence, all the sections from Section 296 forward in H.R. 2295 appear to have been added
subsequent to the PMG Committee’s review. H.R. 2295, 41st Cong. (June 24, 1870). See
also PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17.
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included Section 152 with its amended language, as recommended in the PMG
Committee Report; that is, Section 152 did not contain a criminal penalty. No
legislative committee hearings concerning HR 2295 were held; no reports were
issued.
Additionally, HR 2295 contained a series of provisions added by the House
Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads to the legislative package that had been
drafted by the Congressional Commission. Two of those newly added provisions
were Sections 297 and 296. Section 297 was the mail fraud provision,69 and Section
296 dealt with closely related subject matter.70
(a) How Did It Happen that There Were No Legislative Committee Reports
or Other Explanatory Commentary on the Newly Drafted Provisions
Contained in HR 2295, Including the Mail Fraud Provision?
As far as can be determined, Section 297 in HR 2295, when it was introduced
into the House on June 24, 1870, was the maiden appearance of the mail fraud
provision.71 As mentioned above, there were no legislative committee reports, nor
were any legislative hearings held relating to HR 2295. Upon reflection, this is not
surprising since most of the bill reflected the Commission’s work, and the comments
of the PMG Committee72 generally served as a commentary on the Commission’s
draft. Given the availability of the Commission’s draft and the PMG commentary,
the House of Representatives Post Office Committee chaired by Representative
Farnsworth, which introduced the proposed HR 2295, may well have thought that
there was no need for their committee to issue an additional report in support of the
bill.73 But, of course, this left the provisions that the Post Office Committee had
added to the Commission’s draft without any explanatory commentary.
Also, note the short time interval between the issuance of the PMG Report and
the introduction of HR 2295. There may have been some perceived urgency in
introducing the bill in the hope that it might be passed during that session of
Congress. The short interval between receiving the draft and comments from the
PMG Committee and introducing it in the form of HR 2295 to Congress left little
69

H.R. 2295, § 297 (June 24, 1870). This was the original version of the mail fraud
statute that was enacted as Section 301 and that was previously examined in detail. See supra
Section II.A.2.
70
H.R. 2295, § 296 (June 24, 1870) (providing that the Postmaster General, upon
determining that a person or firm was conducting a fraudulent lottery, could forbid the
payment of any postal money order to such person and instruct postmasters to return
registered letters to the writers thereof, marking them, “fraudulent”).
71
See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (explaining that Representative
Farnsworth, in his comments on the floor of the House regarding Section 150 (i.e., Section
152 in the PMG report) in a clear reference to Section 297 and 296 indicated that those
sections had been incorporated into the bill by the Post Office and Post Roads committee).
72
See PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at 8–9.
73
The summary of the scrutiny given to H.R. 2295 as described at the beginning of the
Senate consideration of the bill supports this observation. See supra note 59.
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time to prepare a legislative committee report regarding the provisions that the
Committee had added to the bill.
As we shall see, however, pertinent statements were made on the floor of the
House of Representatives regarding the bill, and these both included some
statements often quoted regarding the proposed mail fraud provision as well as some
additional relevant statements that have not been generally referred to. Additionally,
there was a key action taken on the floor of the House of Representatives that we
believe was significant and that, in context, may be viewed as a turning point
regarding the then-future of the mail fraud statute.
(b) How Did Section 297, the Mail Fraud Provision, Come to Be Added to
HR 2295?
All the materials considered thus far in this paper contribute to answering this
question and, we believe, shed additional light on the mail fraud statute’s origins and
early history. A more narrowly focused explanation is presented below.
There is a statement in the PMG report near the beginning of the Section 152
commentary that can be viewed as a recommendation to which the drafting of
Section 297 was a response: “We are of opinion that Congress ought to go to the
extreme limit of its power to prevent the frauds which are perpetrated by lottery
swindlers through the mails, and which they could not successfully carry on except
by using mail facilities.”74
The drafting of Section 297 and its inclusion in HR 2295 can be viewed as a
direct response to this comment in the PMG Committee Report, issued a few months
earlier. The reader will note, of course, that the “extreme limit” statement in the
Report focused on addressing the frauds perpetrated by lottery swindlers, while the
language of the mail fraud provision applied more broadly to all types of fraudulent
schemes, without expressly mentioning lottery fraud. There are, however, reasons
why, even though lottery swindles were the primary target, it may have been seen
as useful to draft the provision in broad terms.
Drafting the mail fraud provision broadly was probably seen as the best way to
attack not only lottery swindles but also closely related frauds that use games and
schemes, which did not fall neatly into the lottery fraud category. Drafting it broadly
so that it covered frauds perpetrated through the mails that did not involve games of
chance may also have seemed a logical and reasonable extension, especially insofar
as the provision was aimed (by some of the language in Section 297) at frauds that
would involve the same type of misuse and abuse of the mails as was caused by
fraudulent lotteries and other games of chance.
Further, one can point to the fact of the centrality of the use of the mails in
Section 297, as well as its mention of misusing the post-office establishment, and
the language referring to the proportioning of the punishment to the degree of abuse
74

PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at 19. It seems likely that Joseph Ware
may have been responsible for this sentence, which is very similar to the overall thrust of the
1866 letter. See, e.g., S. 148, 39th Cong. (1866).

2021]

THE ORIGIN OF FEDERAL AUXILIARY CRIMES

1101

of the post-office establishment. All this language amounts to an effort to focus the
statute on those frauds “which they could not successfully carry on except by using
mail facilities[,]”75 that is, lottery swindles and similar mass-mailing kinds of frauds.
The language in Section 297, including the proportionate punishment sentence,
fits nicely with the kinds of harms to the Post Office Department that lottery
swindles and similar kinds of mass mailing frauds cause, as described in the 1866
letter.76 The very inclusion of the proportionate punishment language can be viewed
as positive evidence that the mail fraud provision originally was aimed primarily at
lottery swindles and other mass mailing fraudulent crimes, though it substantively
swept more broadly.77
Finally, the fact that Joseph Ware served both on the PMG Committee and, four
years earlier, was the author of the 1866 letter, also may be viewed as significant in
regard to the drafting of the mail fraud provision, its inclusion in HR 2295, and its
contents, especially when one takes into account what was written in the PMG report
and the subject matter of the earlier letter. Indeed, one must wonder more generally
about the responsibility of Ware for both the commentary on Section 152 prepared
by the PMG Committee and, possibly, for the drafting of Section 297. His
fingerprints are clearly seen on the former. There is a strong link between the 1866
letter and the focused targeting of lottery swindles found in the PMG commentary
on Section 152. One can also, with reason, speculate about whether Ware may have
consulted with the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads and may even have
had a role in the actual drafting of, and/or the adding of, Section 297 to HR 2295.
75

PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at 19.
Earlier in this paper, we also noted how the 1866 letter’s cataloging of some of the
harms caused to the post office establishment by lottery fraud naturally fit with the
proportionate punishment language of Section 297. See supra Section II.A.2.b. The presence
of punishment language in Section 297 in H.R. 2295 is arguably strong evidence supporting
a link between that section and the 1866 letter and that an important purpose of Section 297
was to attack lottery frauds and their ilk, especially regarding offenses “which . . . could not
successfully [be] carr[ied] on except by using mail facilities,” as described in the PMG
report. PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at 19; H.R. 2295, 41st Cong., §297 (June
24, 1870).
77
Another link between Section 152 and Section 297 of H.R. 2295: the drafters of
Section 297—the legislative committee—may have borrowed from the amended language
of Section 152. Thus compare “the schemes devised and intended to deceive and defraud”
phraseology in Section 152 with the “having devised . . . any scheme or artifice to defraud”
language in Section 297. H.R. 2295, 41st Cong. §§ 152, 297 (June 24, 1870). It is also worth
calling attention to the fact that Section 296 in HR 2295, introduced for the first time along
with Section 297, closely tracked some of the language of Section 152 in the bill when it
referred to “fraudulent lottery, gift enterprise,” or schemes, and provided for post office noncriminal interventions regarding such fraudulent schemes by forbidding payments of postal
money orders sent in response to such schemes. Id. § 296. It also provided for return to the
remitters of the sums paid in such money orders as well as the return of registered letters
marked fraudulent sent as part of such schemes. Id. Section 296 can thus be viewed as
providing a link between the more general language of the mail fraud provision and a special
concern about lottery fraud conduct.
76
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True, this is merely speculation, but given the totality of the circumstances, it would
not be a surprise if he were involved in this way.78
(c) But Why Was a Provision Like Section 297 Even Needed, Given the
Existence of Section 152?
Given the time sequence, we know that Section 152 was in the draft postal code
(March 1870) three months before the mail fraud provision was officially added to
the draft code, i.e., when HR 2295, which included Section 297, was introduced into
the House of Representatives (June 1870). But that raises a question: were not lottery
frauds and schemes to defraud already generally covered by Section 152, which had
been amended in accordance with the recommendation of the PMG Committee and
now contained broad language covering all kinds of frauds? Why was the addition
of a broad anti-fraud provision involving the use of the mails like Section 297 even
needed, given the existence of the amended Section 152?
As previously noted, Section 152, as recommended by the PMG Committee,
and incorporated into HR 2295, did not include a criminal penalty. Accordingly, it
may have been thought that to exercise the “extreme limit”79 of congressional power,
a provision that included a criminal sanction was needed. The reason for the failure
of the PMG committee to add a criminal penalty to Section 152 has already been
suggested. It may also have been thought less objectionable to include a criminal
penalty in a more traditional general criminal provision like Section 297 than to
include it as punishment for violating a ban on sending lottery materials through the
mails.
The sequence and timing of these particular steps taken in the legislative
process help explain the context in which the mail fraud provision was drafted and
are suggestive of the fortuity involved. Had the sequence and/or the timing been
different—that is, had a criminal penalty been added to Section 152 by the PMG
committee—it is likely that the legislators would not have seen a need for a provision
like the mail fraud statute and that this provision might not have been drafted and
enacted at that time.
It was only sometime after HR 2295 (with Section 297 already included) had
been introduced in the House and, during the course of the floor consideration of the
bill in the House on December 7, 1870, six months after the introduction of HR
2295, that the criminal penalty was added to Section 150 (the renumbered Section
152). Thereby, two anti-lottery-fraud and anti-fraud general provisions with criminal
penalties were created, each drafted in a different form. We review below in detail
how this amendment of Section 152 came about.
78

One might ask: if Mr. Ware were so deeply involved, why had the PMG committee
not itself recommended the inclusion of the mail fraud provision? Recommending additional
sections appears to have been outside the purview of the committee. The mandates of the
PMG committee prevented it from adding any new substantive provisions. Adding a clause
to an existing provision, however, seems to have been acceptable; the PMG Committee did
that with Section 152. See PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at 3–4, 19–20.
79
Id. at 19.
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As it turned out, the addition of a criminal penalty to Section 152 on the House
floor arguably also had important, long-term consequences for operations under the
mail fraud provision. Indeed, it may now be seen as a turning point and the beginning
of a process that eventually led to the demise of the role of the mail fraud provision
as a federal self-defensive offense.
7. Congressional Statements on the Floor of the House Relating to Section 150
(Formerly Section 152, Which Became Section 149 in the Enacted Legislation) and
the Original Mail Fraud Provision80
We have reviewed certain executive branch materials as well as some
legislative materials that provide important and relevant background to the drafting
and enactment of the mail fraud provision. We now turn to the consideration on the
floor of Congress of both Section 150 and the mail fraud provision, Section 297. As
previously mentioned, almost all of the authorities, scholarly81 and judicial82 alike,
cite the following excerpt from a statement made by Representative Farnsworth on
December 7, 1870, and many refer to it as the only congressional history regarding
the mail fraud provision—that the provision was “intended to prevent the frauds
[which are mostly found] in the large cities . . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions
generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the
country.”
In fact, however, there is much additional useful information and background
regarding Sections 297 and 150, to be culled from the House debates surrounding
this excerpt. Consider, for example, the fact that the excerpt quoted above was
uttered during a discussion of issues relating to Section 150, although the specific
Farnsworth-quoted comment did relate to Section 297 (and also to Section 296).
This point deserves emphasis. The oft-cited quotation referring to Section 297 by
Representative Farnsworth on the House floor did not occur in a debate about
Section 297 but rather in a discussion of Section 150! A fuller recounting of the
debate that the above excerpt was taken from is very informative. It reads as follows
(with our commentary in italics interspersed below the specific excerpts in roman
type (most of which are comments made by Representative Farnsworth)):
“Mr. Farnsworth: I do not think it wise to strike out this section [ed. Section
150]; it is in the present law, and I am willing to let it stand for what it is worth.”83
Mr. Farnsworth’s statement above was made in response to a motion by
Representative Sargent, with supporting argument, to delete Section 150 (i.e.,
Section 152 in the PMG report) from the bill on the ground that it had no provision
for enforcement. Mr. Farnsworth had initiated his response with the foregoing
80

The quotations from the House floor statements quoted in this section begin at CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870).
81
See e.g., Peter T. Barbur, Mail Fraud and Free Speech, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 942, 969
n.201 (1986). Numerous other law review articles cite this quotation.
82
See, e.g., McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987).
83
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870).
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sentence, but then he immediately continued with the sentences immediately below
in what appears to be a digression:
“There is a great deal of this matter now transmitted through the mails. There
are sections further along in the bill, which have been incorporated into it by the
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, and which are intended to prevent
the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities of New York and
Philadelphia, chiefly in New York, by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally,
for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country . . . .”84
Representative Farnsworth, the chair of the Post Office Committee, switched
here from discussing Section 150 to talking about “sections further along in the
bill.” He does not identify the specific sections, but from what follows, it is clear that
he is referring to Sections 297 and 296 in the then-current bill, enacted a year and
a half later, in 1872, as Sections 301 and 300, the original mail fraud provision and
the accompanying provision. The foregoing excerpt contains the lengthy clause
beginning with the words, “which are intended to prevent the frauds,” which is
usually quoted as the only legislative history statement relating to the mail fraud
statute.
It is also noteworthy that, as Representative Farnsworth makes clear, the mail
fraud provision was added to the bill by his Committee; this is confirmation that it
was not part of the Congressional Commission’s original draft, nor was it part of or
specifically recommended in the Postmaster General Committee’s Report.
It is further worth mentioning that the “thieves, forgers, rapscallions, etc.”
statement could easily be a general description of the lottery swindles mentioned in
the PMG report and described in detail in the 1866 letter.
Mr. Farnsworth proceeded in his congressional debate statement to describe
in more detail the kind of swindles at which Sections 297 and 296 were aimed: “I
have here on my desk a large number of specimen circulars and letters sent out,
which have been forwarded to the Post Office Department in this city. They were
sent from various bogus offices in the large cities . . . .”85
Representative Farnsworth refers here to swindles initiated by the mass
mailing of circulars and letters sent out from fictitious addresses in large cities. Such
mailed circulars and letters were a characteristic of counterfeiting frauds, as well
as lottery frauds and other kinds.
“Some of them are schemes for selling counterfeit money . . . . [T]he
countryman . . . sends to the address of the agent, in New York, for instance, ten,
fifteen, or twenty dollars, with an order for as much as it may purchase. A box or
package is sent to him, perhaps, which upon being opened is found to contain waste
paper, sawdust or may be bogus money.”86
This is the so-called sawdust swindle which, as we shall see, became a matter
of major attention in the 1889 revision of the mail fraud statute, treated in detail
infra. It is worth noting that this appears to have been a widely prevalent form of
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
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swindle nineteen years earlier. Representative Farnsworth, of course, could as well
have used lottery fraud conduct as an example. Indeed, one might have expected him
to do so since, after all, this was ultimately a debate about Section 150. Perhaps he
declined to use lottery swindles as his example because that would have highlighted
the duplicative coverage of Sections 297 and 150 and thereby sown confusion.
The type of counterfeiting scheme Representative Farnsworth refers to is a
scheme that, something like lottery fraud, may rely on large scale mailing of
circulars to entice victims and involves some (but not all) of the same kind of harms
to the postal system as the lottery fraud schemes that we believe were the source
point for the idea of a mail fraud statute. Generally, Representative Farnsworth’s
comments here remind of the fact that the mail fraud statute was primarily aimed at
frauds committed through large-scale or mass mailings “which they could not
successfully carry on except by using mail facilities.”87
“He [the postmaster] ought, therefore, to be empowered in some way to
ascertain the character of these letters, and to return the money to those who have
been thus deluded into sending it. That, however, is not a reason for this section,
though it is a reason for some of the subsequent sections of this bill. It certainly will
do no harm to declare that it shall be illegal to send lottery and gift-concert circulars
through the mails.”88
Representative Farnsworth, in stating that “That . . . is not a reason for this
section,” is referring to Section 150. In referring to “the subsequent sections,” he
is specifically referring to Section 296, which provided for returning sums of money
to the victims of the swindles when they made payment by postal money orders.
Finally, he returns to commenting on Section 150. Having made the case regarding
fraudulent use of the mails, and saying that there is no harm in declaring it illegal
to send lottery and gift-concert circulars through the mails, he may be implying that
such materials can also be used to perpetrate swindles. Here, for the first time in
this extensive digression, having come back to Section 150, he specifically mentions
lottery and gift-concert circulars, the principal subject of Section 150. Note that as
of that particular moment in time, Section 150 still had no criminal enforcement
mechanism attached to it. Also note that in these remarks, Representative
Farnsworth has put the focus on frauds perpetrated through the mails, not on the
mere mailing of lottery materials. But when stating that it would certainly do no
harm to declare it illegal to send lottery materials through the mail, he seems to be
saying that the fact that Section 150 lacks a sanction is not a reason to delete the
provision.
At that point, a vote was taken on Representative Sargent’s motion to strike
Section 150; it was defeated.89 Immediately following, Representative Brooks made
a motion to add a criminal penalty to Section 150.90
87

See PMG COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 17, at 19–20.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870).
89
See Id. (“[T]he motion of Mr. Sargent, to strike out the section . . . was not agreed
88

to.”).
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8. How Did a Criminal Penalty Come to Be Added to Section 150 (Which Earlier
Was Section 152 and Later Became Section 149)?
There is much that can be learned from the legislative actions relating to Section
150. The final clause in that provision, as recommended in the PMG report and
introduced in HR 2295, stated: “and any such letters or circulars shall be detained
by the postmaster at the office of mailing or delivery, and disposed of under the
instructions of the Postmaster General.”91
Thus, Section 150, the successor provision to Section 13 in the 1868 statute,
did initially have a non-criminal enforcement provision in its 1870 incarnation—it
provided for the detaining of the letters and circulars prohibited to be deposited in
the mails and their disposition in some manner to be prescribed. But Representative
Brooks, just before Representative Farnsworth made the statements described in
detail above and just before Representative Sargent made his motion to strike
Section 150, had succeeded in removing this non-criminal enforcement mechanism
from the section, on the ground that “it would . . . expose the correspondence of the
people to a scrutiny and espionage of a most dangerous character . . . .”92
Immediately following this action, Representative Sargent, as mentioned above,
moved to delete the entire section on the ground that it was “a dead letter” for the
reason that now no sanction was provided for its enforcement.93 But as previously
noted, after Mr. Farnsworth made his statement in favor of retaining the section
(which included the digression relating to Section 297), Sargent’s motion to delete
the section failed to obtain a majority vote.94
Mr. Brooks then proceeded, in apparent response to Mr. Sargent’s highlighting
of the now-absence of any enforcement provision in Section 150, and Mr.
Farnsworth’s statement regarding frauds perpetrated through the mails, to propose
the addition of a criminal penalty to Section 150.95 Mr. Farnsworth, in response, as
the manager of the bill, stated he had no objection to the Brooks proposal; a vote
was taken, and the Brooks amendment passed.96 And so on December 7, 1870—
without any fanfare, any comment on the fact that this provision could now
effectively be used to bar lottery materials from the mails, any recognition of the
redundancy that this section created with Section 297, or any acknowledgment that
91

H.R. 2295, 41st Cong. § 150 (June 24, 1870).
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See id. (quoting Mr. Brooks as he said he “wish[ed] that this fraudulent use of the
post office shall be arrested . . . .”).
96
Id. This response by Representative Farnsworth is troubling. He, of course, was
aware of the extent of the redundancy between Section 150 and Section 297. As long as
Section 150 lacked a criminal sanction, it remained different from Section 297. Attaching a
criminal penalty to the section removed the main difference. Representative Farnsworth’s
failure to raise a question about it suggests that, in fact, these congressmen may have engaged
in an elaborate dance to reach a predestined result, outlawing lottery materials from the mail
on pain of criminal sanction.
92
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it was a reversal of the earlier congressional action stripping the penalty from the
same provision—a criminal penalty was added to Section 150.97
What was going on here? Anything more than the obvious addition of a
criminal penalty to Section 150? Perhaps. There was an oddity in the digression by
Representative Farnsworth, with his going into such detail about Section 297 and
the use of the mails to perpetrate “sawdust”98 swindles, when Section 150 was under
immediate scrutiny. Perhaps what this was really about was the aforementioned
ongoing major controversy about lotteries and sending lottery materials through the
mails. Adding a criminal penalty to Section 150 would be a major victory for the
anti-lottery forces. By highlighting the use of the mails for fraud in the consideration
of Section 150, including, implicitly, lottery swindles, Representative Farnsworth
kept the focus on an aspect of some lottery mailings, enforcement against which was
most likely not controversial, and thereby diverted attention from the major
controversy regarding a ban against all lottery materials. Was this a way of trying to
garner a few more votes for Representative Brooks’ motion to add a criminal penalty
to the section without highlighting the fact that this provision would effectively bar
lottery materials from the mails irrespective of their use in perpetrating swindles?
This could be the explanation for what otherwise seems to be an inexplicable
digression.99
Also tending to support this explanation, Representative Brooks, in making his
motion to add a criminal penalty to Section 150, immediately after Representative
Farnsworth had made his lengthy statement about Section 297, stated: “I thoroughly
agree with the remarks just made by the chairman of the committee. . . . I am
desirous, as he is, that some penalty shall be provided for this fraudulent use of the
post office . . . . I wish that this fraudulent use of the post office shall be arrested,
particularly as the headquarter of these frauds are in the city which I in part
represent.”100
Representative Brooks thus (with the probable collaborative assistance of
Representative Farnsworth) characterized Section 150, to which he had just
proposed the addition of a criminal penalty, as a provision that dealt with using the
mails to perpetrate frauds while omitting to mention that the main thrust of this
97

Subsequently, Representative Sargent tried to delete the words “or so-called gift
concerts” on the ground that all agreed that fraudulent lottery material should be banned from
the mails, but there were charitable, legal fundraisers in many states, and the bill swept too
broadly in prohibiting them from the mails. His proposed amendment to this effect failed.
Later there was another effort in the same direction that for a time succeeded—viz. the
addition of the word “illegal.” See supra Section II.A.7.
98
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870).
99
Another possible more benign explanation for Representative Farnsworth’s
digression to discuss Sections 296 and 297 and the use of the mails in fraud schemes may
have been his wish to point out to the members of the House that there were related
provisions much further along in the bill (which would not otherwise be apparent to the
members). Moreover, the manager of the bill might not reach its higher-numbered sections
in the course of shepherding the bill.
100
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (emphasis added).
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provision would be to bar lottery materials from the mails through a criminal
penalty, irrespective of any connection to fraudulent behavior.
And so, a criminal penalty was added to Section 150,101 a major development
not only in connection with the long-standing lottery controversy but, as we shall
soon see, also in the developing early history of the mail fraud statute.
But the supporters of lotteries still had a card to play. During further
consideration of Section 150 in Congress, the adjective “illegal” was attached to the
word “lotteries,” so that only illegal lottery materials were barred from the mails.102
The intention, it appears, was to allow states where lotteries were still legal to be
able to send such materials through the mails. As enacted in 1872, Section 149
(formerly Section 152 and then 150) of the postal legislative package read as
follows:
That it shall not be lawful to convey by mail, . . . any letters or circulars
concerning illegal lotteries, so-called gift concerts, or other similar
enterprises offering prizes, or concerning schemes devised and intended to
deceive and defraud the public for the purpose of obtaining money under
false pretenses, and a penalty of not more than five hundred dollars nor
less than one hundred dollars . . . . Is hereby imposed upon
conviction . . . .103
But that amendment lasted only four years. In 1876, Congress struck the word
“illegal” from Section 149.104 The anti-lottery forces finally won a total victory, at
least with respect to banning all lottery materials from the mails—a ban enforceable
through criminal prosecution.

101

CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 36 (1870).
The word “illegal” was attached to the noun lotteries during the final consideration
of the postal legislative package, which was enacted in June 1872. HR 2295 had failed to
achieve passage during the 41st Congress. The package, which included the mail fraud
provision as well as Section 150 with its criminal penalty, was reintroduced in the 42nd
Congress as HR 1. H.R. 1, 42d Cong. (1872). The proposal to amend Section 150 (which
became Section 149) by adding the word “illegal” originated with the Senate Committee on
Post Offices and Post Roads, chaired by Sen. Ramsey. The committee recommendation
(along with numerous other recommended amendments) was approved by the Senate on
April 22, 1872. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2650 (1872). The House version of the
legislation did not include this amendment. See H.R. 1, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. (1871). A
conference committee was appointed to consider this as well as dozens of other differences
between the two bills. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3893 (1872). The conference
committee reported its recommendation on May 31, 1872, that the House accept the
amendment of Section 150 (as well as dozens of other amendments made by the Senate).
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 4105 (1872), and the entire legislative package was
approved on June 8, 1872.
103
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 288, 312.
104
4 CONG. REC. 4261–64 (1876); see also FOWLER, supra note 17, at 63–64.
102
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9. The Relationship Between Section 149 and Section 301
As described above, the enactment of both Section 301 (originally Section 297)
and Section 149 (earlier, it had been Section 152, and then it became Section 150)
may be viewed as the result of chance timing and the fortuitous creation of two
closely related and partially overlapping provisions. But with both on the books and
both being criminal provisions, it is useful to describe the relationship between them
in both analytical and practical terms.
There is an obvious similarity between the substantive coverage of the second
“concerning” clause in Section 149 and the coverage under Section 301. While not
identical, it is similar enough to ask how the two sections relate to each other. How
is the partial redundancy between them to be handled?
The statutory approach in Section 149 is different from that of Section 301.
Section 149 bans categories of materials from the mails by making it a crime to send
materials of the indicated type through the mails.105 Section 301, on the other hand,
is a more traditional criminal provision containing the structure and, mostly, the
usual elements of a crime.106
The premise underlying the criminal banning from the mails of certain kinds of
materials (including lottery letters and circulars) is that there are certain kinds of
materials, the very nature of which justifies banning them from the mails. It involves
a theoretical basis different from ordinary crimes for federal intervention. The notion
is that the mails, a federally operated method of communication for the people, is
corrupted or harmed when evil or corrupting materials are sent through the mails.
This is a property-like approach to the banning of intrinsically bad things from the
mails. Section 148 in the 1872 postal legislation puts obscene publications on the
list of banned items,107 and Section 149 can be viewed as an attempt by Congress to
expand the list still further by adding two categories, namely, circulars concerning
lotteries and fraudulent schemes.108
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the criminal banning of
lottery materials from the mails reflected in Section 149 in 1877 in Ex Parte
Jackson.109 The prohibition against sending circulars relating to lotteries, that is, a
particular kind of gambling materials, through the mails was seen as similar to a
prohibition against sending obscene materials, both being deemed the kind of
materials that are injurious to public morals.110
The inclusion of a prohibition against letters or circulars concerning schemes
to defraud might seem to be more of a stretch, in part because this type of material
does not necessarily reveal its corrupt nature on its face. Among the arguments
105

Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 288, 312.
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 288, 323 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341). Of course, this provision also had some special features as described supra Section
II.A.1.
107
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 148, 17 Stat. 288, 302.
108
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 288, 302.
109
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
110
See id. at 736–37.
106
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against upholding such a ban would be the concern that a path would be opened to
applying a similar approach to materials related to many traditional crimes, thereby
undermining the actus reus/mens rea approach of the traditional criminal law.
The question of using a banning approach against materials concerning
schemes intended to defraud—that is, the second “concerning” clause in Section
149—only reached the Supreme Court long after the first “concerning” clause had
been upheld in Ex Parte Jackson.111 On the ground that, inter alia, the second
concerning clause of Section 149 was largely redundant of—and would have
undermined enforcement under—Section 301, in 1911, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Stever,112 narrowed that clause of Section 149 by construction. The
Court read into the second “concerning” clause in Section 149 a limitation to
schemes to defraud that involved lotteries.113
Differences between an approach involving the criminal banning from the
mails of certain types of materials and the traditional actus reus/mens rea approach
used in ordinary crime control help to explain the differing decisions regarding the
two “concerning” clauses of Section 149.
The result was that prosecutions under Section 149 served to ban lottery
materials as well as lottery materials used in aid of fraudulent schemes, while
Section 301 could be used to focus on all other schemes to defraud. While there was
no legal bar to prosecuting lottery schemes to defraud under Section 301, as a
practical matter, if such were to be prosecuted, it was easier to do so under Section
149. In fact, it was even easier to prosecute such cases under the first “concerning”
clause of Section 149, namely, sending lottery materials through the mails.
Consequently, during the post-1872 period, lottery fraud schemes were
generally not found among the cases prosecuted under Section 301. Why prosecute
for lottery fraud under Section 301, needing to prove a number of different elements,
when one could more easily prosecute for simply violating the prohibition against
sending lottery materials through the mails?114
The ironic result of this pattern of enforcement was to eliminate the very
category of crime—lottery fraud—from prosecution as mail fraud under Section 301
that had been the original, galvanizing cause for the drafting of the mail fraud offense
in the first place.115
The elimination of lottery fraud as a significant area of prosecution under the
mail fraud statute had an important long-term consequence. Lottery frauds, as has
been contended here, were the archetype of the category of frauds at which Section
301 was originally and primarily aimed. Among other things, lottery frauds tended
111

96 U.S. 727 (1877).
222 U.S. 167 (1911).
113
Id. at 174–75.
114
See infra note 119 for a listing of some of the cases prosecuted under Section 149.
115
See, e.g., U.S. v. Watson, 35 F. 358, 359 (E.D. N.C.1888) (“It is claimed that the
statute [Section 5480] was aimed against lottery companies. There is a statute (Rev. Stat. §
3894 [§ 149]) especially devoted to that matter. The words of Section 5480 are plainly
general.”). See also Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 306–11 (1896) (gratuitously
inserting in a mail fraud prosecution not involving a lottery a reference to lottery swindles).
112
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to cause exactly the multiple kinds of harm to the post office establishment at which
the mail fraud statute in its original form was targeted, and that led to the particular
language used in the statute.
With lottery frauds largely removed from the Section 301 prosecutorial docket,
there was a question as to whether any other large category of frauds involving the
mails that were being prosecuted would present a similar range of potential concrete
harms to the post office. Were there other frauds using mass mailings that would
cause harm to the Post Office operations, in the same way as did lottery frauds?
B. The Case Law Handed Down Between 1872 and 1889: What Can It Tell Us
About the Interpretation Of, and Operations Under Both Section 301
and Section 149?
During the period between the mail fraud enactments in 1872 and 1889 (when
Section 301 was amended), there were a series of prosecutions under Section 301
and Section 149, which produced a limited number of reported cases. What can be
learned from this small body of case law?
First, some general conclusions: A variety of different types of fraudulent
conduct are reflected in the cases, and we shall not try to describe them all. As
discussed above, not unexpectedly, there do not appear to have been any
prosecutions involving lottery fraud under Section 301 during this period.
While the 1872–1889 case law reveals some prosecutions in which multiple
letters and circulars were mailed to potential victims,116 as far as can be determined
from this body of judicial opinions, the type of mass mailings that were used in the
lottery fraud cases were not common. An exception may have been the
aforementioned sawdust swindles, which often did utilize mass mailings.
Regarding another matter arising out of the language of Section 301, it merits
mention that there is not in any of the Section 301 judicial opinions any discussion
of the extent of the harms caused to the post office establishment insofar as they may
have affected the sentence imposed. That should not be surprising, however, since
116

See, e.g., U.S. v. Flemming, 18 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1883) (detailing how
defendants sent letters to solicit investments in a fake mutual fund); U.S. v. Hoeflinger, 33
F. 469 (E.D. Mo.1887) (describing how defendants sent letters to potential victims who were
led to believe they were heirs to large fortunes in England; the plaintiff would obtain from
them a fee for his services) [Interestingly, the same scam is being perpetrated today using
the internet.]; United States v. Wooten, 29 F. 702, 703 (E.D.S.C. 1887) (detailing how the
defendants posed as business merchants and ordered goods with no intention of paying for
them); U.S. v. Watson, 35 F. 358, 358 (E.D.N.C. 1888) (holding that ordering goods by mail
without the intent to pay for them is indictable as a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”); United
States v. McMillan, 29 F. 247 (E.D.S.C. 1886) (describing how the defendant sent circulars
through the mail, using assumed names and offering items for sale that he did not possess
nor intend to furnish to the putative purchasers); United States v. Stickle, 15 F. 798
(C.C.W.D. Wis. 1883) (explaining how a defendant promoted a fake tea distribution business
whereby he solicited victims to act as agents for defendant in selling the goods and solicited
payments for agent’s sample case, which he had no intention of providing).
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length of sentence issues were not generally reviewable upon appeal.117 The absence
of any discussion of the language in Section 301 dealing with proportionate penalties
does not necessarily mean that that language was not being applied by trial judges.118
During this same period, between 1872 and 1889, Section 149 was also actively
enforced against those who sent lottery materials through the mails.119 For the most
part,120 these were simple cases to prosecute, and, as previously stated, it is believed
these prosecutions drew the air out of lottery frauds and generally accounted for the
fact that lottery fraud was not being prosecuted under Section 301.
III. THE 1889 AMENDMENT OF SECTION 5480 (THE REVISED STATUTES
RENUMBERED VERSION OF SECTION 301)
A. Introduction
Recall that in 1870, when Representative Farnsworth on the floor of the House
referred to a type of serious fraud involving the use of the mails, he used as his
illustration the sawdust swindle, not lottery fraud. In 1889, work was being done on
a general revision of the postal code, and some unusual amending language was
added to Section 5480,121 the mail fraud provision. Language relating to the sawdust
swindle and the offering of counterfeit money for sale was added to the generally
broad anti-fraud language of Section 5480. How this happened, the addition of such
specific language to Section 5480 attacking particular kinds of misconduct and
fraudulent behavior, is another brief tale worth telling. Examining some detailed
legislative history materials can help us to understand how this amending language
came to be added to Section 5480.122
117

It may be the case that this provision was not being fully used, which may have been
attributable to the fact that lottery fraud and related offenses that caused the type of harms
described in the 1866 letter were not frequently being prosecuted under Section 301.
118
Issues arising out of the language in Section 301 that provided, “The indictment,
information, or complaint may severally charge offenses to the number of three when
committed within the same six calendar months; but the court thereupon shall give a single
sentence . . .” were addressed in a number of cases. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17
Stat. 288, 323; see, e.g., In re Henry, 123 U.S. 372 (1887).
119
See, e.g., U.S. v. Duff, 6 F. 45 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881); U.S. v. Moore, 19 F. 39 (N.D.
Ill. 1883); U.S. v. Dauphin, 20 F. 625 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884); U.S. v. Clark, 22 F. 708 (C.C.E.D.
Va.1885); U.S. v. Zeisler, 30 Fed. 499 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887); U.S. v. Noelke, 1 F. 426, 440
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
120
A few cases prosecuted under Section 149 or its successor provisions did not involve
materials sent through the mails relating to simple lotteries but rather more complex
arrangements where the courts had to decide whether the activities involved what amounted
to a lottery. See, e.g., U.S. v. McKenna, 149 F. 252 (W.D.N.Y. 1906).
121
H.R. 9268, 50th Cong. § 5480 (1889).
122
This legislative history seems not to have been treated previously by criminal law
scholars or legal historians. Those who directed their attention to the 1889 revision of the
mail fraud statute typically asserted that there is no legislative history for the changes made
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B. Changes in the Legislative Language Effected in the 1889 Legislative Revision
We begin with an overview of the changes that were made in the 1889 revision
of the mail fraud statute, which is reproduced here (with minor editorial elisions) in
the accompanying footnote.123
in the statute. See Rakoff, supra note 3. The reason why this small block of legislative history
materials has not previously been uncovered is not entirely clear. It could be explained by
the fact that the direct subject of the committee report that incorporates the relevant history
was a bill proposing a separate statute, not an amendment of Section 5480. One needs to dig
into the materials attached to that report to see that, in fact, almost everything in the report
relates to amending Section 5480.
123
The 1889 revision of the mail fraud reads as follows:
SEC. 5480. If any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, or
distribute, supply, or furnish, or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, bank notes, paper money, or any obligation or security of the
United States . . . or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such
counterfeit or spurious articles, or any scheme or artifice to obtain money by or
through correspondence, by what is commonly called ‘the sawdust swindle,’ or
‘counterfeit money fraud,’ or by dealing or pretending to deal in what is
commonly called ‘green articles,’ ‘green coin,’ ‘bills,’ ‘paper goods,’ ‘spurious
Treasury notes,’ ‘United States goods,’ ‘green cigars’ . . . to be effected by either
opening or intending to open correspondence or communication with any person,
whether resident within or outside the United States, by means of the Post-Office
Establishment of the United States, or by inciting such other person or any person
to open communication with the person so devising or intending, shall, in and for
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, place or cause to be
placed any letter, packet, writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement in any postoffice, branch post-office, or street or hotel letter-box of the United States, to be
sent or delivered by the said post-office establishment, or shall take or receive any
such therefrom, such person so misusing the post-office establishment shall, upon
conviction, be punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and by
imprisonment for not more than eighteen months, or by both such punishments,
at the discretion of the court. The indictment, information, or complaint may
severally charge offenses to the number of three when committed within the same
six calendar months; but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall
proportion the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the postoffice establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and
device. SEC. 2. That any person who, in and for conducting, promoting, or
carrying on, in any manner by means of the Post-Office Establishment of the
United States, any scheme or device mentioned in the preceding section, or any
other unlawful business whatsoever, shall use or assume or request to be
addressed by any fictitious, false, or assumed title, name, or address, or name
other than his own proper name, or shall take or receive from any post-office of
the United States any letter, postal card, or packet addressed to any such fictitious,
false, or assumed title, name, or address, or name other than his own lawful and
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A careful reading of the amended—now even more wordy—1889 version of the
statute reveals that (1) it continues to make criminal the devising of a scheme to
defraud; (2) it expressly and separately makes criminal devising a scheme to sell,
etc. “real” counterfeit currency; (3) it makes criminal the devising of a scheme to
sell, etc. anything represented to be counterfeit money; (4) it makes criminal
schemes to obtain money by the sawdust swindle; (5) it makes criminal dealing in
or pretending to deal in green articles, green cigars, etc. (listing the various kind of
terms that the criminal element used to describe the counterfeited items); but (6)
otherwise it generally retains the several key clauses that were in the 1872 version
of the mail fraud statute (as discussed in Part II).
Although set out separately, items (3) and (4) would also qualify as schemes to
defraud, and item (4) would seem to be a specific example of (3). Further, item (5)
arguably covers the same ground as items (1), (2), (3), and (4) in cases where the
argot terms are used. Accordingly, although there are interpretative issues that would
need to be resolved, essentially Section 5480, as revised in 1889, covers two basic
sets of conduct—schemes to defraud, including schemes to pretend to sell
counterfeit money, and schemes to sell counterfeit money.
The addition of these specific terms to the mail fraud statute in 1889 was a
curious development on several counts. When a statute is originally broadly
formulated, as was the mail fraud statute, it seems rather odd to later add specific
categories that seem to attach special importance to a certain type of fraud, namely,
the sawdust swindle, that otherwise seemed plainly covered by the original, broad
language. While the oddness of this addition raised a question whether the 1889
revision was intended to narrow the application of the statute, generally courts
concluded that the statute was broadened.124
Separately, it seems odd to insert language that deals with “non-fraudulent”
offers for the sale of counterfeit money into a provision that had previously dealt
exclusively with schemes to defraud. As we shall see, there is an explanation why
that language was added. Finally, the inclusion of terms referring to the argot
language of the street was, to say the least, unusual.125
proper name, shall, upon conviction, be punishable as provided in the first section
of this act.
S. REP. NO. 50-2566 (1889) (Report to accompany H.R. 9268, 50th Cong. § 5480 (1889)).
Additional subsections of the Act dealt with non-criminal enforcement tools relating to the
subject matter of Section 2. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, 25 Stat. 873.
124
See Bettman v. United States, 224 F. 819, 825 (6th Cir. 1915) (“[W]e think the
statute has been broadened by each amendment made thereto. It is well settled that the effect
of the amendment of 1889 was to expand the statute.”).
125
The colorful argot language persisted in the mail fraud statute for almost sixty years
before being deleted in 1948 as part of a cleaning up of the statute in a codification process
that was not supposed to produce any substantive changes in the applicable law. The scheme
to sell counterfeit money (in addition to the original scheme to defraud) language is still in
the current-day statute. It is not often noted that the mail fraud statute also can be used to
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C. Legislative History Relating to the 1889 Amendment of Section 5480
The moral crusaders, previously referenced here only in the background, for
the first time appear front and center, in the direct history of the 1889 amendment of
the mail fraud statute and in the person of one of their leading figures, Anthony
Comstock.
The story of the 1889 legislative materials revolves around Comstock, famous
as a crusader on behalf of morality causes, targeting activities like obscenity,
prostitution, and gambling126 as well as, it turns out, counterfeiting schemes and
other broad-scale schemes of fraudulent conduct. Comstock was appointed to be a
post inspector in 1873—after a successful, intense personal lobbying campaign in
Washington, D.C.—to enact federal statutory provisions relating to obscene
materials.127
Therefore, by early 1889, Comstock had already been a postal inspector for
fifteen years and was also well-known as a founder and agent of the New York
Society for the Suppression of Vice.128 Indeed, in their forwarding through the post
office hierarchy of a key letter that he wrote regarding the bill then under
consideration by a Senate committee, two high-ranking postal officials separately
noted in their cover letters not only his position as a postal inspector but also the fact
that he was the “agent” of the aforementioned New York Society.129 There seems
little doubt that, at the time, Comstock wielded an unusual degree of power and
influence beyond that of any ordinary postal inspector.130
In 1888–1889, the Senate Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads had
before it a legislative bill, HR 9268, referred to it by the House Committee on the
Judiciary,131 which proposed the enactment of a new statutory provision, designated
as a bill to punish dealers and pretended dealers in counterfeit money and other
prosecute schemes that arguably do not involve schemes to defraud. Compare Offenses
Against the Postal Service, Pub. L. No. 60-350, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130–31 (1909) (using
language such as “saw-dust swindle,” “green articles,” and “green goods” as examples of
“counterfeit or spurious articles”) with Frauds and Swindles, Pub. L. No. 80-772, §1342, 62
Stat. 683, 763 (1948) (using the all-encompassing language of “anything represented to be
or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article . . . .”).
126
See ANNA LOUISE BATES, WEEDER IN THE GARDEN OF THE LORD: ANTHONY
COMSTOCK’S LIFE AND CAREER 2–16 (1995); Margaret Talbot, Purity: The Women Who
Resisted Anthony Comstock’s Crusade Against Vice, THE NEW YORKER, July 26, 2021, at
72 (reviewing AMY SOHN, THE MAN WHO HATED WOMEN: SEX, CENSORSHIP AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE GILDED AGE (2021)).
127
See BATES, supra note 126, at 69–91.
128
Id. at 2, 99–100.
129
See S. REP. NO. 50-2566, 2–3 Exs. A, B (1889) (Report to accompany H.R. 9268,
50th Cong. (1889)) (discussing exhibits A and B); FOWLER, supra note 17, at 60.
130
See BATES, supra note 126, at 16 (noting that Comstock was a crusader and “no
ordinary reformer”).
131
S. REP. NO. 50-2566 (1889) (Report to accompany H.R. 9268, 50th Cong. (1889))
(containing the history described in the text, Comstock’s letter as an exhibit attached to the
Report, as well as several other relevant documents).
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fraudulent devices. This bill would have made it a felony to deposit in the mails an
“offering, or proposing to sell, give, deliver, or transfer, to any person, any imitation
of any coin, bill, note, bond, or other security of the United States, or
banknotes . . . .”132
HR 9268 thus proposed a new provision separate from the mail fraud statute to
expressly criminalize the conduct described therein; in this referral by the House
Judiciary Committee, there was no express mention of the mail fraud provision,
Section 5480, or its contents.133 Both by its reference to “dealers and pretended
dealers” and to “counterfeit money and other fraudulent devices,” the bill seemed
aimed, through a single provision—offering to sell phony money—at those who
purvey counterfeit money as well as those who pretend to purvey counterfeit money
in order to defraud their victims.134 In the body of its brief Report, the House
Judiciary Committee focused its attention only on what seemed to be sawdust
swindles and pretended sales of counterfeit money.135
In response to HR 9268, Comstock, in his role as a postal inspector, wrote a
strongly worded letter that proceeded through the Post Office Department hierarchy
and included cover letters from high-ranking postal officials and a slightly longer
letter from the Assistant Attorney General for the Postal Department.136
In his letter, Comstock recommended substituting a different House bill, HR
8859, which had been introduced the previous spring,137 in place of HR 9268. HR
8859,138 unlike HR 9268, consisted of a proposal for a substantial amendment of
Section 5480, the mail fraud statute. In its Report, the Senate Committee endorsed
the substitution of Comstock’s recommended bill for HR 9268.139 Subsequently,
Comstock’s recommended bill was passed by both Houses of Congress and signed
into law. This became the 1889 version of Section 5480,140 as reproduced supra in
footnote 123.

132

S. REP. NO. 50-2566, at 2 (1889) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1501, at 1–2 (1888).
See H.R. REP. NO. 50-1501, at 1–2 (1888).
134
S. REP. NO. 50-2566, at 1 (1889).
135
See id.
136
See S. REP. NO. 50-2566, at 1 (1889) (indicating that some changes had been made
in the bill that Comstock forwarded).
137
H.R. 8859, 50th Cong. (1888). Congressman White of New York introduced this
bill. While there is no direct evidence to support this, reasonable speculation is that Mr.
Comstock had a role in drafting this bill.
138
Id. In its journey from Comstock’s desk through several Post Office Department
offices, HR 8859 was amended somewhat in style and details, but its basic substance
survived.
139
S. REP. NO. 50-2566 (1889) (Report to accompany H.R. 9268, 50th Cong. (1889)).
140
H.R. 9268, 50th Cong., § 5480 (1889) (current version at Offenses Against the Postal
Service, Pub. L. No. 60-350, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130–31 (1909)).
133
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Comstock introduced his letter141 by referring to HR 9268 as a bill “to punish
dealers and pretended dealers in counterfeit money,” so he seemed to be addressing
the issues posed by the relationship and possible confusion between prosecutions of
dealers and pretended dealers in counterfeit, but in the body of the letter he, too, only
referred to pretended dealers.142 In criticizing HR 9268, he proceeded to focus the
letter on “this business of pretending to sell counterfeit money . . . carried through
the mails,” stating, “That the mails . . . are the essential element of success to this
business.”143 He noted that in the past year and a half, he had received more than
1,500 complaints and proceeded to describe the kinds of schemes whereby
“thousands of circulars” were being sent out with a fictitious name used in the return
address at the bottom of each circular.144 Reply mail sent to the fictitious address
would be bounced from one location (often a bar or cigar store, the proprietor of
which would deny knowledge of the addressee) to another.145 Multiple post office
boxes with multiple names on each box were also used, and different underlings
would pick up mail from them each day.146
Comstock identified a perceived failing in HR 9268 in the following terms:
“The great majority of the circulars sent out by the ‘green goods’ men at the present
time would not come within the purview of this bill as very few of them ‘advertise’
any ‘imitation of any coin, note, bond,’ etc. Rather they characterize their operations
as ‘green articles,’ ‘queer coin,’ ‘bills,’ ‘paper goods,’ ‘green paper goods,’ etc.”147
This comment seems to have been the principal rationale offered by Comstock
for the addition of the argot language to Section 5480. An alternative way to proceed
would have been for prosecutors to rely on expert testimony regarding the meaning
of the argot terms that were being used in the circulars. Thereby, the awkwardness
of introducing the argot terms into Section 5480 could have been avoided.
It is noteworthy that in his letter, Comstock did not otherwise discuss the sale
of counterfeit money that did not involve a swindle. The bill he recommended did,
however, fold language covering such conduct into Section 5480, where it remains
to this day. Why was this language added to the mail fraud provision? While
Comstock did not offer any explanation for incorporating this additional “nonfraudulent” criminal conduct into this statute, we can deduce the reasons therefor.
Comstock’s legislative recommendation avoided two problems that the
enactment of HR 9268 would have created. Were that bill enacted, it would have
overlapped and probably conflicted with Section 5480. Even more important, if
cases were brought under the language of that bill, the prosecution would risk losing
them if the wrong choice were made—that is, if, for example, the prosecutor charged
141

Letter from Anthony Comstock, Post-Office Inspector, Post-Off. Dept., to Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate (Sept. 7, 1888) (found in S. REP. NO. 50-2566,
Exhibit D, at 3–5 (1889)).
142
Id. at 3–5.
143
Id. at 3.
144
Id. at 4.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
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a defendant with offering to sell counterfeit, and the defendant countered by
claiming that theirs was not a sincere offer, but instead that they were engaged in a
sawdust swindle, or vice versa. But once Section 5480 was enacted, the defendant
could be charged with both offenses under separate clauses of that section, and if
either one of them were sustained, the conviction would stand.148
Accordingly, while the 1889 revision of the mail fraud statute as enacted was a
verbose version of a federal criminal statutory provision, it was legally a better
approach than the more succinct alternative, HR 9268, for which it was substituted.
IV. THE 1909 REVISION OF SECTION 5480—BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
A. Language Changes in the 1909 Revision
The 1909 version of the mail fraud statute—Section 5480 in the Revised
Statutes—is reproduced in the accompanying footnote.149
148

The implications of two Milby decisions, Milby v. U.S., 109 F. 638 (6th Cir. 1901)
[hereinafter Milby I] and Milby v. U.S., 120 F. 1 (6th Cir. 1903) [hereinafter Milby II], are
that the problem of shifting defenses, where the defendant may have dealt in, or pretended
to deal in, counterfeit currency, generally seems to be solvable under the 1889 statute by
addressing such conduct through the multi-count pleading of both of those charges, based on
separate clauses of the same provision. That approach combined with a court’s application
of Milby II’s view of motions in arrest of judgment—no reversal if any count can be
sustained—would seem to solve the shifting defense’s concern: The defendant may have a
defense to one or the other charge, but under Milby II, if at least one of the charges is
sustainable, the conviction would be upheld.
An interpretation of the pre-1889 mail fraud statute, had it been generally accepted,
would have avoided the necessity for this 1889 amendment of the statute. In U.S. v. Jones,
10 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1882), the Southern District of New York upheld a conviction of Jones:
“The scheme to defraud described in the information may be a scheme to defraud any person
upon whom the bad money might be passed, and it is within the scope of the statute, although
no particular person had been selected as the subject of its operation. Any scheme, the
necessary result of which would be the defrauding of somebody, is a scheme to defraud
within the meaning of section 5480, and a scheme to put counterfeit money in circulation is
such a scheme.” Id. at 470. Thus, in Jones, the immediate purchaser of the counterfeit
currency had not been deceived. He was going to receive what he paid for. Only the
secondary or tertiary recipients of counterfeit money were going to be defrauded. However,
Jones ruled that such actions were sufficient to create a scheme to defraud under the statute.
The Jones decision was problematic because its interpretation strained and extended the
language of the statute.
149
Offenses Against the Postal Service, Pub. L. No. 60-350, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130–
31 (1909) (Section 5480 appeared as Section 215 in the 1909 legislation passed by the 50th
Congress in Chapter 321). This version is similar to the present-day provision adopted in the
1948 codification of the federal criminal code, except that the argot language added in 1889
was still in the statute. As previously mentioned, the argot terms were finally removed from
the statute in 1948. The 1909 version of Revised Statute, § 5480 reads as follows:
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A few simple language changes made in the amendment of the mail fraud
statute in 1909 produced a basic structural change in the thrust of the offense. The
federal self-defensive elements were removed from the statute, thereby effecting a
change in the theory underpinning this provision. These changes resulted in an
offense that became the model for many subsequently enacted federal auxiliary
crimes. Accordingly, it is important to try to learn what triggered the 1909 changes.
The 1909 version of Section 5480 made changes in the 1889 version in two key
respects. First, the language that ensured that the use of the mails was a central and
substantive feature of any cases prosecuted, namely, the portion that read, “to be
effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or communication
with any person, . . . by means of the post-office establishment of the United States
. . .”150 was deleted.
Second, the language that indicated that the provision was targeted at harm to
the post office establishment was stripped out of the statute: Namely, the references
to “misusing the post office establishment” and the proportionate punishment
language in the final sentence were removed. The result was that while the use of

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give
away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, bank note, paper money, or any obligation or security of the United
States, or of any State, Territory, municipality, company, corporation, or person,
or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or
spurious article, or any scheme or artifice to obtain money by or through
correspondence, by what is commonly called the “saw-dust swindle,” or
“counterfeit money fraud,” or by dealing or pretending to deal in what is
commonly called “green articles,” “green coin, “green goods,” “bills,” “paper
goods,” “spurious Treasury notes,” “United States goods,” “green cigars,” or any
other names or terms intended to be understood as relating to such counterfeit or
spurious articles, shall, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed, any letter, postal card, package,
writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, whether addressed to any person
residing within or outside the United States, in any post-office, or station thereof,
or street or other letter box of the United States, or authorized depository for mail
matter, to be sent or delivered by the post-office establishment of the United
States, or shall take or receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within or
without the United States, or shall knowingly cause to be delivered by mail
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such letter, postal card,
package, writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, shall be fined not more
than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.

150

The quoted language had been contained in both the 1872 and 1889 versions of the
mail fraud provisions, as reflected in previous references to these statutes. See Act of June 8,
1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283 (1872); H.R. 9268, 50th Cong., § 5480 (1889).
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the mails was still retained as an element, it was no longer required that it be a
significant part of the scheme or an index of harm to the post office establishment.
Why were these deletions made?
B. Legislative History Materials Relating to the 1909 Revision
It turns out there is a limited set of legislative history materials relating to the
1909 version of the statute that provides some information about the changes made
in the statute. These materials offer a clear explanation for one of the deletions and,
possibly, explain most of the other changes. More important, they also provide some
basis for deducing whether the lawmakers appreciated the nature and significance
of the changes made in the statute.
The relevant legislative history materials include: (1) two reports of a
Commission appointed by the President for revising the laws of the United States,151
(2) reports in the Senate and House that are the respective versions from each House
of the report of a Special Joint Committee152 appointed to respond to the
aforementioned Commission reports, and (3) brief comments in the Congressional
Record153 regarding these proposals that were made in the course of the legislative
process.
The aforementioned Commission filed two reports, one on May 15, 1901,154 and
the second on December 15, 1906.155 The Commission’s first report provides the
most relevant information as to why the changes were made. The comment to
Section 190 (the mail fraud provision is so numbered in this Report) reads as
follows:
. . . Section 5480, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of March 2,
1889, contains the words “to be effected by either opening, or intending to
open, correspondence or communication with any person, whether
resident within or outside the United States, or by inciting such other
person or any person to open communication with the person so devising
or intending.” It is obvious that these words are not necessary to establish
the criminality of the act sought to be denounced or the jurisdiction of the
151
The appointments of the members of the Commission were made under the authority
of the Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. L. 58; see also H.R. Rept. 6203, 59th Cong. 2d Sess.,
Jan. 10, 1907.
152
See 42 CONG. REC. H. 539–41 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1908) (statements of Sens. Dalzell,
De Armond, Sherley, Houston & Macon) (explaining the reasons for appointing a Special
Joint Committee); see also 42 CONG. REC. S. 725 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1908) (Senator Heyburn
summarizes the work of the Commission and the Joint Committee).
153
See 42 CONG. REC. S. 1026 (1908).
154
Sen. Doc. No. 68, Pt. 2, 57th Cong. 1st Sess. Report of Commissioners, May 15,
1901.
155
FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO REVISE AND CODIFY THE CRIMINAL AND
PENAL LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, § 190, at XVI (1906) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION].
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United States over the same, and it further appears from the decision in
United States v. Smith, (45 Fed. Rep., 561) that they add an element to the
proof necessary for conviction. They are accordingly omitted in the
revision here submitted. The section is further amended by adding the
words “or shall knowingly cause to be delivered by mail according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by
the person to whom it is addressed.” The following words are omitted:
“The indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge offenses
to the number of three when committed within the same six calendar
months, but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall
proportion the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of
the Post-Office Establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent
scheme and device.”156
The Commission focused on the two changes that it was recommending in the
existing mail fraud statute. It explained the first—the deletion of the language that
required that an element of the scheme to defraud be “opening of correspondence
with any person . . .”—on the ground that that element was not necessary to establish
either criminality or jurisdiction and further that it imposed a requirement that could
defeat a prosecution, citing United States v. Smith.157 In Smith, the judge sustained a
demurrer in a case where the original communication to the victim was through a
newspaper ad and therefore did not involve the opening of correspondence by
mail.158 The Commission also recommended the deletion of the language relating to
sentencing and apportioning punishment according to the degree of abuse of the post
office establishment without offering any specific explanation or reason for this
action.159 The Commission demonstrated no awareness of the original reasons for
this language that it proposed to delete from the statute.
A possible explanation for the last-mentioned deletion is that the Commission
believed that the apportioning punishment sentence was linked to the opening
correspondence provision, which it arguably was—that deletion of the latter was
also grounds for omitting the former.
The requirement of opening correspondence could trip up a prosecution, as it
did in Smith. The case and the resulting change in the statute could be important
insofar as fraudulent schemes during this era, involving some use of the mails, were
more likely to be initiated through newspaper advertisements.160
156

Id.
Id.; U.S. v. Smith, 45 F. 561 (E.D. Wis. 1891).
158
See Smith, 45 F. 561.
159
The language “so misusing the post-office establishment” was also omitted but was
not expressly mentioned in the Report. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 155.
160
See William M. O’Barr, A Brief History of Advertising in America, 6 ADVERT. &
SOC’Y REV. 3 (2005) (discussing consumer discontent with disingenuous advertisements for
patent medicines). An increasingly literate population, newspapers with national circulation,
and thousands of subscribers made the use of newspapers as communication vehicles
157
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There also may have been other factors that contributed to the deletion of the
proportionate penalty language from the statute. Consideration of different kinds of
harms to the post office in determining the sentence was probably not as relevant in
mail fraud prosecutions as it once was. The mass-mailing type of fraud that produced
the most such harms may no longer have been so common. Also, as noted
previously, we have no evidence, one way or the other, in the reported cases about
how often sentencing judges used the proportionate penalty language of the statute.
It may well have been the case that this language had fallen into disuse. Also, trying
to achieve the goal of targeting real harm to the post office establishment through
this kind of provision had been a weak measure from the outset; it left the pertinent
language inapplicable in many cases, and, though its intent seems clear, it did not
serve to ensure that prosecutions were limited to, or even involved, many cases
where real harms to the post office establishment were being caused.161
What is concerning, however, is that, while all these were good reasons why
changes were needed and made, neither the Commission, nor the Special Joint
Committee of the House and Senate, nor the responsible legislators, showed any
awareness of why the language that was deleted had been originally placed in the
statute. Nor did they show any understanding of the significance of the changes that
they were making. Indeed, there is no indication that any legislators in the House or
Senate at the time were even aware that these deletions had been made by the
Commission.162
generally effective and cost-efficient. See, e.g., Robert McNamara, History of Newspapers
in America, THOUGHTCO, https://www.thoughtco.com/history-of-newspapers-in-america4097503 [https://perma.cc/LR5H-LT8C] (last updated Feb. 24, 2020).
161
It can be argued that the import of the various factors listed in the text in this
paragraph and the preceding one is that while the mail fraud statute had begun as a selfdefensive federal crime, in practice, it was no longer functioning in that role—that it had
effectively become what amounted to an auxiliary federal crime. The subsequent stripping
out of the self-defensive language from the statute thus simply recognized that reality.
162
There is no mention of the deletions in the statements made on the House and Senate
floors. Senator Heyburn, who was chair of the Special Joint Committee and managed the bill
in the Senate, in his review of the reasons for appointment of the Special Joint Committee,
fails to mention the Report of the Commission from May 15, 1901, stating that the first report
from the Commission was its Final Report in 1906. The 1901 Report is the only source in
the legislative history that we have found where attention is called to the fact of the deletions.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO REVISE AND CODIFY THE CRIMINAL AND PENAL LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES, § 190, at XVI (1901). Apparently, there was dissatisfaction with the
Commission’s Final Report, which contained 9000 provisions. See also S. REP. NO. 388
(1910); 42 CONG. REC. H. 539–41 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1908) (statements of Sens. Dalzell, De
Armond, Sherley, Houston & Macon); 42 CONG. REC. S. 725 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1908)
(statement of Senator Heyburn, who was the manager of the bill in the Senate debates and a
chair of the Special Joint Committee).
The introductory comments to the Final Report also included the following: “The notes
appended . . . to the criminal and penal laws in former reports are incorporated with notes on
the remaining titles in this report, so that ready reference may be had to same.” FINAL REPORT
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As an immediate prelude to the enactment of the 1909 legislative revision of
which the mail fraud statute was a part, on January 7, 1908, Senator Heyburn, on
behalf of the Senate members of the Special Joint Committee on Revision of the
Laws, issued its report on S. 2982, containing its recommendations on the revision
and codification of the criminal and penal laws of the United States prepared by the
Commission, whose work is described supra. Interestingly, the specific comments
made in the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Section 216, the mail fraud
provision in S. 2982, which was to become the mail fraud provision in the 1909
statute, made no reference to the aforementioned comments regarding Section 190
that the Commission made in its first report. Rather the Senate Special Joint
Committee only stated the following: “Aside from a transposition of language, all
other changes made in this section are indicated by italics and need no other
explanation.”163
Senator Heyburn also shepherded the reading of the bill, which appeared in the
Congressional Record. In that context, after first calling attention to the amendments
of the language in Section 216 that extended the reach of the mail fraud statute extraterritorially, he made a comment in a vein similar to the comments made in the report
of the Special Joint Committee: “I do not think there is any other change, which is
not obvious upon the face of the bill, that needs any further explanation.”164
Both comments linked to Senator Heyburn seem innocuous and do not seem to
add substantively to the legislative history. In fact, however, they can be viewed as
significant. When Senator Heyburn states that no other explanation is needed, this
appears to signify that he believes that the nature of the changes is clear. That may
be so, but what is missing is any indication of what the specific changes are, their
significance, and the reasons therefor.
Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to infer that Senator Heyburn, and, likely,
his colleagues on the Joint Committee, did not think that any changes in the mail
fraud provision were significant. Overall, the best that we can infer from this
treatment of the changes in the mail fraud statute from the 1989 version is that the

OF THE COMMISSION TO REVISE AND CODIFY THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, at 6 (1906).

Accordingly, while the Final Report included provisions as modified by the intervening
House Committee (that is, the House version of the Joint Special Committee), it would seem
to have also included the notes accompanying the Commission’s First Report. Id.
163
H.R. REP. NO. 2, pt. 1 at 22 (1908) (Report to accompany H.R. 11701). New
language in the bill was, as was stated, indicated by italics, but deletions were not revealed
by ellipses or any other indications, so the reader who was not familiar with a previous
version of a section, nor with the comments in the Commission’s first report, would have no
way of knowing what changes were made by way of deletion.
164
See generally 42 CONG. REC. S. 1026, (1908). Both the Special Joint Committee
Report and the Congressional Record reading occurred in January 1908. The bill was
reported out from Conference and printed approximately one year later on February 27, 1909.
Pub. L. No. 60-350, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088, 1088–1159 (1909). By this time, some
renumbering of the sections had occurred, and the mail fraud provision was Section 214. Id.
at 1130.
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legislators who voted on the bill were not likely to have perceived the changes as
weighty and significant.
The comments that were made could also be interpreted to support the
conclusion that these legislators were not aware of the changes that had been made
earlier by the Commission. In the context of a massive penal law draft, with a great
many different issues occupying the attention of the legislators, the fact that
deletions had been made earlier in the process could easily have been overlooked.165
It is a stunning conclusion to draw that the amendments of the statutory
language of the mail fraud provision that converted it into the first true federal
auxiliary offense and initiated the long-term growth of this important category of
federal crime may have been accomplished with the responsible legislators unaware
of the changes made in the language. It is even more damning if they failed to
appreciate the significance of these changes.
V. CONCLUSION
Viewed from a distance, the origins of the mail fraud statute are intertwined
with the long-running cultural, social, and political battles revolving around lotteries
and the transmission of lottery materials through the mails. The early mail fraud
statute also crossed paths with the 19th-century moral crusaders, for example,
through its links to the suppression of lotteries, which, as a form of gambling, were
a prime crusade target and, more directly later, in the person of a leading crusader,
Anthony Comstock. There was also a close relationship between the original mail
fraud statute (Section 301) and the eventually successful efforts to ban lottery
materials from the mails by attaching a criminal penalty to Section 149. And, of
course, it was concern about harms to the post office establishment being caused by
lottery and gift exchange frauds extensively using the mails that originally triggered
interest in drafting legislation that became the mail fraud statute.
More specifically, the legislative and executive historical documents uncovered
here help to explain what led to the drafting of the original mail fraud statute and the
two subsequent major revisions that occurred within the next thirty-seven years.
These documents reveal, for example, that the drafting of the mail fraud crime arose
out of concerns about lottery fraud and similar swindles, and in its beginning, that it
was an offense intended to protect against the harms those kinds of crimes could
cause to the mails and the post office establishment. At the same time, given that
goal, it was drafted in a way that made it a not-very-robust protector of the post
office establishment: it could be and was prosecuted in cases that did not involve
many concrete harms to the mails. The weakness of the form in which it was drafted
was likely one of the factors that contributed to its ultimate transformation into a
pure federal auxiliary offense.
165

Of course, it is possible that Senator Heywood and other members of the Special
Joint Committee were aware of the changes and their significance and chose not to inform
their legislative colleagues. However, it is difficult to discern any likely motive that there
might have been for such an action.
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Other factors also probably played a role: The kind of crime that was the raison
d’être for the enactment of the mail fraud provision, namely lottery fraud, which is
also the archetypal offense for causing harms to the post office establishment,
became a less serious crime problem, not as a result of effective mail fraud
prosecutions, but rather through criminal enforcement under another provision,
Section 149.
Similarly, emphasis on enforcement against the sawdust swindlers probably
reduced the number of players still committing such crimes. As a result, another
crime category that caused real harms to the Post Office Department probably no
longer appeared with frequency on the mail fraud prosecution docket. While other
kinds of mail frauds may also have caused harms to the Post Office Department,
there may not have been enough of them to justify the retention of the proportionate
punishment language in the statute.
Finally, changes in the nature of some features of fraud schemes being
perpetrated at the time probably limited the extent to which the pre-1909 form of the
mail fraud statute could be effectively enforced. More specifically, as large-scale
fraud schemes began to be more frequently initiated through newspaper advertising,
it tended to make the then-existing version of the mail fraud statute problematic.
This appears to have been the immediate catalyst for the removal of the federal selfdefensive language from the statute in the 1909 legislative process.
The effect of the transformation of the mail fraud offense that took place
between its original enactment in 1872 and its revision in 1909 was to create a crime
that was no longer drafted in a way that aimed at punishing those who caused harm
to a direct federal interest. While this new version of the mail fraud crime contained
a federal jurisdictional link, viz. use of the mails, sufficient to satisfy constitutional
concerns, its structure and thrust made it clear that it had now become an offense
aimed at punishing and deterring fraudulent conduct in much the same way as state
anti-fraud crimes. And this change was accomplished in 1909, without any
indication that Congress was aware of what it was doing to the statute, or its
significance.
This creation of the first pure federal offense auxiliary to state criminal
enforcement was thus not accomplished through a conscious drafting process with
that kind of statute in mind. Rather, it evolved and occurred over time through a
series of steps involving some fortuity and happenstance. Indeed, there was a point
early in its history when—had the timing of the addition of a criminal penalty to a
sister provision been different—the mail fraud statute might not have been drafted
at all. Given its subsequent history, how interpretations of the mail fraud statute
evolved, and its ubiquitous and central role in hundreds, even thousands of federal
prosecutions, it is somewhat shocking to learn now that only because of an accident
of timing it came to be originally drafted. Had the mail fraud statute not been enacted
then, we can only speculate how different might have been the history and the
evolution of federal auxiliary crimes.

